Micro-data in Macroeconomics by Chen, Tuo
Micro-data in Macroeconomics
Tuo Chen
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy









This dissertation contains three essays onMacroeconomics. Detailedmicro-level data is
used in all three essays. The first chapter studies wealth inequality problems. More specif-
ically, it focuses on capital return inequality among university endowments. It combines
university-level data on endowment size, capital returns, and portfolio allocations into a
unified dataset. Using panel data regression, I show a strong impact of size on investment
return. Everything else the same, the biggest endowment has a capital return 8 percent
higher than the smallest endowment. However, after adjusting for risk using Sharpe ratios,
the strong positive correlation turns negligible or even negative. This result suggests that
the higher return of bigger endowments can be attributed to risk compensation rather than
to an informational premium.
The second and the third chapters employ firm-level data to study macroeconomic pro-
ductivity. The second chapter documents the sectoral growth paths of measured total factor
productivity (TFP) in southern Europe during the boom that proceeded the great contraction
(1996 to 2007). Using both aggregate and firm-level panel data, I show that TFP in sectors
that displayed fast expansion, such as construction, dropped significantly, while in non-
expanding sectors, such as manufacturing, it stayed stable. I evaluate the relevance of two
alternative explanations of this phenomenon: capital misallocation (the increase in capital
was directed to less productive firms) and labor quality mismeasurement (lower quality of
incoming labor was not fully captured in the TFP calculation). I find that the misalloca-
tion channel is almost negligible. Moreover, worker-firm matched data shows that labor
quality did deteriorate in the expanding sectors but not in the others, giving credence to the
labor-quality mismeasurement hypothesis. A model featuring both the misallocation and
the mismeasurement channels and calibrated to match the micro-level productivity distri-
bution and labor quality distribution predicts that the drop in true TFP was small if labor
quality is measured properly.
The third chapter documents the total factor productivity growth path in China from
1998 to 2015 using both the aggregate and the firm-level data. We find that measured
TFP growth is positive from 1998 to 2011, before turning flat and even negative. A care-
ful comparison between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms reveals that the
slowing down of TFP growth of SOEs is the major contributor to the TFP growth reversal
of the whole manufacturing sector. The reversal is not due to changes in the composition
of production in different sub-sectors, but mostly due to changes within existing firms.
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Chapter 1
Do the Rich Know Better? – Evidence from University
Endowments
1.1 Introduction
Capital return inequality (i.e., capital of bigger size has a higher return) is an accelerating
force of the capital income inequality and thus worsens the wealth inequality. However,
there exists very limited literature on this topic, and even fewer papers exploring the reasons
for the situation due to the lack of data. Therefore, the question naturally arises, how serious
is the capital return inequality? If it is, why does bigger capital outperform smaller capital?
Based on the data of university endowments in North America, this paper observes that
the biggest university endowments exceed the smallest ones by 8 percent in terms of capital
return. This can be explained by the hypothesis that bigger university endowments have
more information about the financial market (the information channel), or that they just
invest more proportionally in risky assets and thus on average achieve a higher capital return
(the risk channel). The university endowment data dictates that the risk channel is the main
contributor to the performance of the university endowments, while the information channel
has a negligible impact. More specifically, after controlling for the risk using Sharpe ratios,
1
bigger university endowments no longer reflect superior performance. Even after explicitly
introducing the information channel, the risk channel still dominates.
Thanks to its unique structure and detailed data, National Association of College and
University Business Officers (NACUBO) data enables me to investigate the severity of
capital return inequality and to make distinctions between the information channel and the
risk channel. It is a panel data set consisting of three pieces of material from 2000 to 2013:
sizes,1 capital returns,2 and portfolio allocations. By regressing the capital returns on the
sizes, I can quantify the capital return inequality. The panel data structure helps to introduce
the university fixed effect, which can be considered as a control for unobserved variables,
such as the reputation effect or network effect of universities. The panel regression result
shows that if we keep the same fixed effect and only vary the sizes, then the biggest en-
dowment is predicted to have a capital return rate 8 percent higher than the smallest one.
To explain this huge capital return inequality, I follow NACUBO and Commonfund 2013
and link the eleven categories of assets in the portfolio allocations to benchmark indexes
of the financial market. Then the weighted variance of the portfolio captures the risk chan-
nel, which can be used to compute the risk-adjusted performance: the Sharpe ratio. Fur-
thermore, the absolute value of the difference between the actual return and the weighted
portfolio return can serve as a proxy for the information channel. The assumption is that if
an endowment with only public information invests exactly in the benchmark indexes, then
the weighted portfolio return should be the same as the actual return. Hence the deviation of
1The size is measured by the market capitalization of the endowment.
2The capital return is the total net rate of return on investment, where total means the inclusion of asset
appreciation and net means the exclusion of management fees.
2
the latter from the former implies how much private information an endowment possesses.
The panel regression of the Sharp ratios on the sizes gives a non-significant negative coef-
ficient. And adding the information channel into the regression does not change the result.
This demonstrates that the risk channel is the dominant channel.
Why does this paper focus on the institutional investors rather than the households as
the primary concern of the capital return inequality is on the latter? It is because NACUBO
has a panel data feature and more detailed categorizations of financial assets in compari-
son to available household data, such as that from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF).
Although the SCF is a high-quality survey,3 it cannot proper panel data because of the ran-
domization of the household selection (Bricker and Sabelhaus 2015). Therefore, it is not
possible to use the SCF data to identify the change in capital return for household i across
two consecutive observations. For a university endowment in the NACOBO data, however,
capital return history is well documented, which helps to introduce the university fixed ef-
fect and control for the heterogeneity besides the size of capital. Moreover, the eleven
explicit categories for assets in NACUBO exhaust all the possible financial asset holdings
of the university endowments, while “it is not possible, in general, to make direct sepa-
rate estimates of the financial characteristics of the individuals in the survey households...”
(CodebookSCF 2014).
There are other papers that also draw inferences about inequality from institutional in-
vestors. Piketty 2014 also uses NACUBO data to explain how capital income inequality
3While this is a generally held belief, there are papers that express doubts about the accuracy of the SCF,
such as the work of Johnson and Moore 2008.
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is aggravated by the capital return inequality and why. Without using the extensive micro-
level data, Piketty compares the capital returns of three university endowments (Harvard,
Yale, and Princeton) to that of the average university endowment in North America. He
reaches the same conclusion that capital return inequality is severe. But the limitation of
the data prevents him from further investigating quantitatively how much impact the size
has on capital return, which is what this paper does. Nevertheless, he hypothesizes that
the endowments of those elite universities have a higher capital return simply because they
have the money to hire the best management teams and thus know more about the market.
In other words, he argues that larger university endowments possess an informational ad-
vantage relative to smaller ones. The online appendix of Saez and Zucman 2016 includes
the data on private foundations obtained from the IRS tax form PF-990. It demonstrates the
same pattern of bigger private foundations outperforming the smaller ones on average.4
This article is linked to four strands of literature. First, the findings contribute to the
literature on capital return inequality, which is still an under-explored subject compared
to other inequality problems, such as income inequality and wealth inequality. A recent
paper by Fagereng et al. 2016 employs the Norwegian administrative data, in which one
can observe both the capital income and wealth holdings of households. They find that
the positive correlation between the capital return and size can explain the gap between the
actual wealth and imputed wealth through the capitalization method. My paper not only
shows more direct evidence of the capital return inequality, but also goes a step further by
identifying the channel behind it.
4It is included in the Table C14: Foundation real returns by wealth class, 1986-2010.
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Second, the capital return inequality sheds some doubts on the capitalization method
used in Saez and Zucman 2016, where the key assumption is that the capital return is ho-
mogeneous across the wealth distribution. The fact that bigger capital earns a higher return
will cause a upward bias of the imputed wealth inequality by capitalization method. This
is confirmed by Fagereng et al. 2016 that the imputed wealth has a much higher Gini co-
efficient than actual wealth. But it needs more research on since there are two important
differences between Saez and Zucman 2016 and mine. First, the IRS tax data only captures
realized capital income, while the capital return in the NACUBO data is the total return
including unrealized capital gain for which no tax is paid. It might be true that bigger cap-
ital has a lot of unrealized capital gain. In addition, the observed IRS categorization of
financial assets is very coarse compared to that of NACUBO: The former basically divides
financial assets into fixed incomes and equities, while NACUBO divides assets into eleven
categories.
Third, this article engages in the discussion of why capital return varies across investors
and favors the risk channel instead of the information channel. Fama 1971 and Eugene F.
Fama 1973 show both theoretically and empirically that riskier assets have a higher ex-
pected return on average, and that the financial market is efficient in the sense that price
fully reveals information. Thus, the information channel should not play a role in capital
return inequality. Yitzhaki 1987 explains the fact that larger investors invest proportion-
ally more wealth in riskier assets due their lower relative risk aversion, while Gomes and
Michaelides 2005 attribute it to the fixed cost of risky assets. However, Arrow 1987 argues
with a simple model that large investors tend to purchase more private information because
5
information is less costly for them than their smaller counterparts when it comes to com-
paring wealth. Thus, they know better about the market and enjoy a higher rate of return.
More recent works, such as those by Piketty 2014 and Kacperczyk, Nosal, and Stevens
2014 share the same idea.
Fourth, the capital return inequality enriches the findings of the return to scale of mutual
funds. Joseph Chen 2004 shows that the return declines with mutual fund size, which can be
explained by the interaction of liquidity and organizational diseconomies. However, Reuter
and Zitzewitz 2010 and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor 2015 find that size has no impact on
mutual fund performance using the regression discontinuity and the panel regression with
fixed effect respectively. The difference of mutual funds and endowment funds may come
from the fact that a mutual fund is much bigger in size on average than university endow-
ments on average. The mean asset size in ibid. is $1,564 million, while that of NACUBO
is only $440 million.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 discusses the data source and
the merging strategy; Section 1.2 demonstrates the existence of capital return inequality;
Section 1.3 then proves that the higher capital return of larger capital is mainly driven by
taking more risk rather than by having more information; Section 1.4 shows other evidence
as a robustness check; and Section 1.5 concludes the paper.
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1.2 The Data
The paper’s data comes from the National Association of College and University Business
Officers (NACUBO). It is in panel data format, spanning across the year 2000 to 2013. The
entity of the observation is in university endowment levels. The data consists of three pieces
of information: the size of endowments measured in market value, the total net returns on
investment, and the portfolio allocationweights. (Hereafter, I will refer to them respectively
as the endowment size data, the capital return data, and portfolio allocation weights, and
altogether as the endowment data, the NACUBO data or the NACUBO endowment data.)
The total net return on investment is used interchangeably with the capital return in this
paper. Total means that the return includes both realized and unrealized capital gain. And
net means that the management fee is excluded from the return. This endowment data is
collected annually by NACUBO based on the self-reporting files of endowments.
Before data analysis, the NACUBO data is needed to be unified.5 One inconvenient
feature of the NACUBO endowment data is that there is no other universal identifier except
for the names of the university endowments.
However, the names are not strictly consistent. Roughly, there are three types of incon-
sistencies. 1. Abbreviation: For example, the State University of New York is sometimes
recorded as SUNY. 2. University name changes: For example, before 2012, Mercyhurst
University was called Mercyhurst College. 3. Prefix or suffix problems: For example,
5Although NACUBO has unified the annual capital return data in one Excel sheet, the other two pieces
of data remain separated by year. Therefore I merge the endowment size data and the portfolio allocation data
for each year with the capital return data, resulting in twenty-eight merges.
7
Dartmouth College is sometimes recorded as Trustees of Dartmouth College. If we use the
traditional way of matching observations, we would not get a satisfactory result. Here I em-
ploy the fuzzy merge command “reclink” in Stata to match a large part of the endowments.
Then I check manually to see if there are any incorrect matches and make the necessary
corrections.
Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 show the general statistics of the NACOBO data. The number of
the observations increases for all three pieces of data. This trend is a result of NACUBO’s
survey strategy. Once an endowment participates in the survey, it will get a reminder the
following year to take part agin.6 The incentive for the endowments to participate in the
survey is the benefit that they can access the data set for research and comparison. The
accuracy of the data is very good. Since most of the annual reports of endowments are pub-
licly available, it is easy to cross check the figures in the NACUBO endowment data against
those of the reports for any given endowment. Moreover, the number of observations is not
exactly the same for all three pieces of data. The capital return data has fewer observations
than the endowment size data and the portfolio allocation data.
There is a noticeable decrease in the observations in the endowment size data and port-
folio allocation data from year 2009 to 2010. This gives rise to the concern of an attrition
problem caused by endowment bankruptcy during or after the great recession. But it is not
a real problem. First, although we do not have the data for the university bankruptcy rate,
we know it is a rare event. Second, even though we attribute all the attritions to university
bankruptcy, it does not bias the results very much. Table 1.3 shows the number of endow-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ments that appear in the data set in year t but disappear in year t+ 1 and t+ 2.7 Generally,
the attrition problem is not very severe since the attrition percentage is rarely above 5 per-
cent.8. We do see that the attrition problem is slightly more severe in year 2009. However,
the attrition is not concentrated only in one group. In face, 2.55 percent attrition comes
from the endowments smaller than $10 million, 4.5 percent from endowments smaller than
$1 billion and larger than $10 million, and 0.4 percent from the biggest group.
Table 1.3: Attrition Problem of Endowment Data
Endowment Size Portfolio Allocation
year N # Attr. % Attr. N # Attr. % Attr.
2000 545 11 2.0 528 16 3.0
2001 588 38 6.5 585 21 3.6
2002 666 3 0.5 629 25 4.0
2003 684 27 3.9 669 28 4.2
2004 707 29 4.1 695 34 4.9
2005 710 15 2.1 699 24 3.4
2006 731 27 3.7 717 37 5.2
2007 749 19 2.5 722 26 3.6
2008 761 44 5.8 717 49 6.8
2009 823 71 8.6 836 73 8.7
2010 795 28 3.5 775 22 2.8
2011 789 26 3.3 793 51 6.4
2012 766 39 5.0 764 10 1.3
Definition of attrition in year t: Observed in year t, but not observed in year t+ 1 and t+ 2.
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
7For year 2012, we just count the number of endowments that appear in the data set in year 2012 and then
disappear in year 2013.
8This attrition percentage can be seen as the upper bound of the endowment bankruptcy since endowments
also drop out of the data set for other reasons.
11
1.3 Quantifying Capital Return Inequality
In this section, I prove that the capital return inequality exists and is actually very severe
by using the capital return data and the endowment size data.
Figure 1.1 shows the ten-year average annual nominal return for endowment groups
with different sizes. This data is collected from NACUBO’s annual reports, not calculated
by university-level data. The history spans from 1988 to 2013, much longer than the unified
data set.9 This figure roughly proves the existence of the capital return inequality. There is
a clear rank of capital return: Groups of bigger endowments are almost always above the
groups of smaller ones. The differences of capital return between the largest endowment
and the smallest ones are quite stable, varying between 2 percent and 4 percent.
The next step is to quantify the capital return inequality more precisely. More specifi-
cally, I check whether an increase in endowment size results in an increase in capital return
and by how much. To see this, I run the panel regression specified in equation 1.1:
RTNit = i + 1 lnENDOWit + 2012t=2000tyeart + "it (1.1)
RTNit is the total net investment return of endowment i in year t. i is the endowment
fixed effect, which accounts for the unobserved variables, such as the reputation effect or
the network effect of universities. The year dummy yeart accounts for the macroeconomic
variation, such as economic booms and recessions. lnENDOWit is the log value of en-
9I use the group return data from NACUBO’s annual reports, not calculated from university-level data,
even after 2000 is to maintain consistency. In actuality, the two are very similar.
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Figure 1.1: Total Net Return of University Endowments of Different Sizes
Ten-year annual nominal return is calculated as the geometric mean of yearly nominal return over
a moving window of ten years.
1988-1997: Smallest $25 million and under, medium $25 million - $100 million, big $100 million
- $400 million, biggest over $ 400 million
1998-1999: Smallest $75 million and under, medium $75 million-$300 million, big $300 million -
$1 billion, biggest over $ 1 billion
2000-2013: Smallest $100million and under, medium $100million - $500million, big $500million
- $1 billion, biggest over $ 1 billion
From 2002 onwards, there are in total six categories, but I calculate the equally weighted mean of
the lowest three categories to make the results comparable to 2000 and 2001
From NACUBO annual reports. It is only available on an aggregate level, not on the university-
level.
13
dowment size. "it is the error term.
The parameter of interest is 1. In order to solve the problem of serial correlation,
the estimation employs White’s heteroskedasticty-consistent estimator, following Arellano
1987. In the baseline specification column 1 of Table 1.4 , which is the panel regression
with fixed effect, ^1 = 0:822. The standard error is clustered by endowments, and the result
is statistically significant at a level of 95 percent.
Table 1.4: Regression of Return on Endowment Size
W/ FE W/O FE W/O FE 2003 - 2013 2003-2013 EX. >1b
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LENDOW .822 .513 .955 1.01
L2.LENDOW .428
S.E. .361 .043 .039 .448 .492
R2 .8351 .8367 .9046 .8935 .8913
Obs. (970,8811) 8811 6670 (948,7162) (908,6573)
In the row ”Obs.”, (970, 8811) means that the regression is run with fixed effect, 8811 is the total
number of observations, and 970 is the number of groups.
Standard error is heteroscedasticity-consistent, and clustered by university endowment.
L2.LENDOW means the two periods lagged lnENDOW .
Column (1) panel regression with fixed effect.
Column (2) panel regression without fixed effect.
Column (3) panel regression without fixed effect and the endowment size is lagged for two periods.
Column (4) panel regression with fixed effect using the subperiod from 2003 to 2013.
Column (5) panel regression with fixed effect using the subperiod from 2003 to 2013 and excluding
endowments larger than $1 billion.
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
How should the severity of the capital return inequality be interpreted? Take one of the
smallest endowments in 2013, Georgia Perimeter College, with an endowment size equal to
$1.17 million, and enlarge its size to the level of Harvard University, which is $32.3 billion.
The predicted capital return would increase by 8.4 percent. If we use the average capital
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return rate, 5.8 percent, in Table 1.1 for both endowments, the capital income difference is
$187.3 million. However, if we assume that Harvard University has a capital return that
equals to 5:8%+ 8:4%
2
= 10%,10 and that Georgia Perimeter College 5:8%  8:4%
2
= 1:6%,11
the predicted capital income difference would be close to $323 million, which by itself is
almost three hundred times the size of the endowment of Georgia Perimeter College. Thus,
the capital return inequality exacerbates the capital income inequality.
There are some concerns about equation 1.1. First, why do I use the regression with
fixed effect as baseline specification instead of random effect? It is because the fixed ef-
fect can fix the omitted-variable bias. University endowments have different investment
philosophies, reputation, network and management teams, etc. All these characteristics are
potentially correlated with the size of the endowment. Thus, the regression without fixed
effect could bias the estimation of coefficient 1. Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor 2015 in-
clude the fixed effect using the same argument. Moreover, the Hausman test favors the
fixed effect specification. Nevertheless, I include the result of the panel regression without
fixed effect as well in estimation for equation 1.1. Although the coefficient of interest de-
clined to ^1 = 0:513 as in column 2 of Table 1.4, it does not change the qualitative result.
The predicted capital return difference between Harvard University and Georgia Perimeter
College is still 5.2 percent.
Another valid concern is that the significance of ^1 may be due to some mechanical
mechanism rather than any interesting economic explanation. It is true that a higher capi-
10The endowment of Harvard University had a capital return rate of 11.3 percent in year 2013.
11The endowment of Georgia Perimeter College had a capital return rate of 5.79 percent in year 2013.
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tal income in year t results in a higher capital return and a bigger endowment size in year
t when keeping everything else the same, including the endowment size in year t   1.
However, this argument has amplified the role of investment income in determining the
size of an endowment by ignoring the expenditure or other sources of the variation of the
size. If we assume that the endowment of Yale University has accumulated all its capital in-
come without consumption or any other variation in size from 2000 to 2013, its endowment
should have been $34 billion in 2013, even slightly bigger than the size Harvard Univer-
sity’s endowment, which is $32.3 billion at the same time. However, the actual size of
Yale’s endowment in 2013 was $21 billion. Moreover, column 3 of Table 1.4 shows the
result of panel regression with the lagged size variable lnENDOWit 2, where the coef-
ficient ^1 drops from 0:513 to 0:43, but still remains both economically and statistically
significant. Even with ^1 = 0:43, the predicted return increase would be about 4 percent if
the size of Georgia Perimeter College’s endowment becomes as big as Harvard’s.
Third, the attrition problemmay cause selection bias: In other words some endowments
leaving the data set because of bankruptcy could give a biased estimation of 1. However,
as I have discussed in the previous section, attrition could hardly be a problem after the
financial crisis of 2008, which is probably the period most prone to the issue. Even if
attrition is a severe problem, as long as the endowments that disappeared from the data
set were relatively small in size, the true 1 could be even bigger than ^1. Only when the
bankrupt endowments are relatively large ones does my estimation have an upward bias.
As a robustness check, I also run the panel regression with fixed effect using subperiod
and subsample. The results are reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.4. The estimated ^1
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is even larger than the baseline specification.
To conclude, the existence of the capital return inequality is consistent with Piketty
2014’s finding. Moreover, I can quantify that the capital return inequality is very severe.
1.4 Risk Channel vs. Information Channel
In this section, I show that the risk channel is the major reason for capital return inequality
by using the portfolio allocation data.
Table 1.2 shows that the portfolio allocation data consists of eleven specified asset types
and one unspecified asset type. They are respectively domestic equities, fixed income,
international equities, private equity, marketable alternatives, venture capital, real estate,
energy and natural resources, commodities, distressed debt, short-term securities and cash,
and others. On average, university endowments invest most heavily in domestic equities
and fixed income, which account for more than 60 percent together. But there is a clear
trend suggesting the decreasing importance of these two assets. Moreover, the weight of
international equities, private equity and marketable alternatives is increasing.
Synthetic Return
This subsection shows how to impute the synthetic return based on the portfolio allocation
and publicly available benchmark indexes, and how it helps alleviate the concern over the
missing data. The next subsection adds that the synthetic return can also be used to construct
a proxy for the information channel.
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According to NACUBO and Commonfund 2013, I assign eleven benchmark indexes to
match asset types.12 Table 1.5 shows the match between the asset types and the benchmark
indexes. All the indexes are widely used and well accepted by the financial market. For
example, the S&P 500 index serves as a proxy to the domestic equities, the Barclays US
Aggregate index proxies the fixed incomes, and MSCI World ex-USA proxies the interna-
tional equities.
Table 1.5: Assets and Benchmark Indexes Match
Asset Class Abbreviation Benchmark Index
Domestic Equities DE S&P 500
Fixed Income FI Barclays US Aggregate
International Equities EQI MSCI World ex-USA USD
Private Equity PE Commonfund Capital Private Equity
Marketable Alternatives ALT HFRI Fund of Funds
Venture Capital VC Commonfund Capital Venture Capital
Real Estate RE NCREIF Open-End Diversified Core
Energy & Natural Resources EN S&P Global Natural Resources
Commodities COM DJ-UBS Commodity
Distressed Debt DD HFRI Distressed Debt
Short-Term Securities/Cash Cash S&P/BGC 0-3m US T-bill TR
Details of the categorization: Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI), Hedge Fund Research Indices(HFRI), National Council of Real Estate Investment Fidu-
ciaries (NCREIF), Dow Jones (DJ), and BGCantor (BGC) (Following NACUBO 2013 Report).
12We do not assign any index to the unspecified asset type for two reasons: First, the weight of this asset
is under 2 percent; Second the NACUBO data does not clearly define what other means.
18
Table 1.6 presents the annual returns of all assets, except for private equity and venture
capital.13 The benchmarks of these two assets are both from Commonfund, an institutional
investment firm that delivers investment solutions for nonprofits organizations, including
university endowments. Commonfund collaborates with NACOBU14 but does not share
their data with outsiders. Since different private equity and venture capital funds may have
very different strategies, it would be inaccurate to use a random private equity or venture
capital fund whose data is publicly available.
Table 1.6: Benchmark Indexes Annual Return
year DE FI EQI PE ALT VC RE EN COM DD CASH
2000 13.3 11.6 5.5 . 19.6 . 14.3 . 31.8 10.5 6.1
2001 -26.8 8.4 -29.4 . -0.8 . 5.6 . -19.5 7.0 4.1
2002 -17.1 10.3 -14.2 . 2.1 . 5.5 . 25.9 2.5 1.7
2003 22.3 4.1 29.7 . 9.0 . 9.3 41.6 23.9 27.6 1.1
2004 13.1 4.3 22.1 . 5.7 . 13.1 24.4 9.1 17.3 1.3
2005 10.4 2.4 25.1 . 10.3 . 21.4 26.8 21.4 15.3 3.0
2006 10.6 4.3 20.5 . 7.0 . 16.3 29.8 2.1 11.3 4.8
2007 18.4 7.0 26.3 . 14.0 . 16.0 41.7 16.2 11.6 4.7
2008 -23.3 5.2 -29.0 . -10.9 . -10.0 -38.3 -35.6 -11.4 1.7
2009 -8.9 5.9 0.6 . -1.2 . -29.8 36.1 18.9 1.7 0.1
2010 13.6 6.5 7.1 . 3.5 . 16.4 11.0 16.8 13.1 0.1
2011 -2.2 7.8 -11.2 . -1.8 . 16.0 -14.9 -13.3 0.4 0.0
2012 34.4 4.2 18.2 . 2.9 . 10.9 7.2 -1.1 8.5 0.1
2013 20.0 -2.0 21.4 . 6.5 . 13.9 1.5 -9.5 13.6 0.0
Mean 5.5 5.7 6.6 . 4.7 . 8.5 15.2 6.2 9.2 2.0
Domestic Equities(DE), Fixed Income(FI), International Equities(EQI), Private Equity(PE), Mar-
ketable Alternatives(ALT), Venture Capital(VC), Real Estate(RE), Energy and Natural Re-
sources(EN), Commodities(COM), Distressed Debt(DD), Short-Term Securities/Cash(CASH)
From publicly available benchmark indexes
Synthetic return is calculated using equation 1.2, meaning that it is the weighted average
13But the raw data is in quarterly frequency.
14The NACUBO endowment reports are compiled by Commonfund.
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of market returns.
RTN synit = aRatW
a
it; (1.2)
whereRat is the return of benchmark index for asset a at time t, andW ait is the portfolio
weight of asset a of endowment i at time t.
Table 1.7 compares actual return and synthetic return. Only the data of the subperiod
from 2003 to 2013 is used. This is because 1) the benchmark data for energy and natural
resources is missing from 2000 to 2002; and 2) the definition of portfolio allocation data
is very different in years 2000 and 2001 from the rest of the years. Synthetic return is
calculated in two ways: by treating the missing returns of private equity and venture capital
as zero or replacing them with the return of index for commodities. The result in Table 1.7
demonstrates that the statistics of the synthetic return and the actual return are very similar.
Moreover, if we replace the dependent variable RTNit in equation 1.1 with RTN synit and
run the same regression, the coefficient ^1 is very close. The upper panel of Table 1.7 shows
this with all the endowments from 2003 to 2013. If we ignore the missing data of private
equity and venture capital, and set them to zero, the coefficient ^1 is 0.7, not far from the
benchmark case where ^1 is 0.955. And if we assign the return of commodities to private
equity and venture capital, the coefficient increases slightly to 0.72.
The lower panel of Table 1.7 focuses on the endowments with a size below 1 billion
dollars. The coefficient ^1 with the synthetic return is even closer to that of the actual
return, which is 1:01 in this specification. This result suggests that the similarity between
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Table 1.7: Similarity between Actual Return and Synthetic Return
Var. Obs.(Reg.) Mean SD Min Max Coef. 1(se)
Full Sample 2003-2013
RTN 7804(7162) 6.93 11.32 -40 62.2 .955(.448)
RTNsyn(PE = V C = 0) 8197(7162) 7.08 9.33 -30.66 30.45 .695(.260)
RTNsyn(PE = V C = COM ) 8197(7162) 7.13 9.81 -30.66 30.45 .722(.267)
Exclude Endow > 1b 2003-2013
RTN 6772(6573) 6.65 11.44 -40 62.2 1.01(.492)
RTNsyn(PE = V C = 0) 7400(6573) 7.13 9.33 -30.66 30.45 .839(.290)
RTNsyn(PE = V C = COM ) 7400(6573) 7.18 9.71 -30.66 30.45 .928(.297)
The column “Obs. (Reg.)” means that the total number of observations of RTN is 7804, and 7162
observations enter into the regression using equation 1.1.
Standard error is heteroscedasticity-consistent, and clustered by university endowment.
NACUBO Endowment-level Data, and publicly available benchmark indexes
the synthetic return and the actual return is higher if we exclude the biggest endowments.
One possible explanation is that bigger endowments deviate more from benchmark indexes
than smaller ones.
The takeawaymessage of this subsection is that the missing returns of private equity and
venture capital will not affect the result very much. This is due to the fact that the weights
of private equity and venture capital in portfolio allocation are tiny. Although there is an
upward trend for private equity, the weight has not surpassed 5 percent yet. The weight
of venture capital is rarely above 2 percents, which is almost at the same level as the asset
categorized as others.
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Controlling for the Risk Channel
In this subsection, I explore whether the risk channel contributes to the capital return in-
equality. The risk of an endowment in investment activity is defined as the volatility of the
portfolio, which is calculated by the weighted volatility of the excess return of benchmark
indexes.
Risk-adjusted performance is used to check how important the risk channel is. The idea
is that if the risk-adjusted performance of endowments is still positively correlated with the
size, it means that besides the risk channel, the information channel also contributes to the
higher return of larger endowments. However, if the positive correlation disappears after
I replace the return with the risk-adjusted performance, then we can conclude that the risk
channel dominates the contribution to the capital return inequality.
The most used risk-adjusted performance is the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio is first





Rf is the risk-free interest rate, RTNi Rf is the risk premium, and i is the standard
deviation of capital return rate of portfolio i. Sharpe 1994 revised the Sharpe ratio by letting
i =
p
V ar(RTNi  Rf), the standard deviation of the excess return of portfolio i. In
this paper, the revised Sharp ratio is used.
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it.15 In computing the standard deviation of the excess return of endowment
i, all the variance and covariance of the excess return of different benchmarks are included.
Eabt is the covariance of the excess return of benchmark a and b in year t if a 6= b, and the
variance of the excess return of benchmark a if a = b. W ait is the portfolio allocation weight
of asset a.
Since the Sharpe ratio is a theoretical measure on which a rational fund manager is
supposed to rely in order to construct the optimal portfolio allocation, it would make more
sense to use the ex ante Sharpe ratio, meaning the return and the standard deviation are all
measured by ex ante probabilities. However, it is almost impossible to get the expected
value in practice. The Sharpe ratio we employ in this paper is the ex post measure.
To construct the standard deviation of each endowment, I estimate the covariance and
variance of the excess returns of the benchmark indexes. The estimation method is Expo-
15Here I use the temporal variation as the proxy for the risk of assets. Alternatively, I can follow Flavin
and Yamashita 2002 to construct the cross-sectional risk measure of assets.
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nentially Weighted Moving Average(EWMA), as expressed in equations 1.5:
mEa+1 = m
E
a + (1  )(Ra  Rf )
ua = (Ra  Rf ) mEa
(Ea+1)
2 = (Ea )
2 + (1  )u2a
Eab+1 = 
E
ab + (1  )uaub
(1.5)
where  is the decay parameter, mEa is the moving average of the excess return of
benchmark a, and ua is the deviation of the excess return of asset a from its mean. The
initial values of iteration,mEa0, Ea0, and Eab0, are the long run values.16
Another thing to notice is that the time period is in quarterly frequency in equation 1.5.
However, the Sharpe ratio needs to be in annual frequency for panel regression. I then take
the average of the variance and covariance within a year as the annual values that enter the
computation of Eit in equation 1.4.
There is a concern that the missing data of private equity and venture capital will induce
an upward bias in estimating the endowment portfolio volatility, because endowments may
use private equity or venture capital to hedge the risk they face in other types of assets.
Therefore, the return of these two assets should be negatively correlated with other assets.
16The long-run mean, long-run variance and long-run covariance are all for the period 1995-2013 except
for the asset Energy and Natural Resource, which is calculated fro 2003-2013 because of the data availability.
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However, this concern is unnecessary. Recent academic research shows that private equity
and venture capital provides few hedging benefits: Welch 2014 proves that the diversifica-
tion illusion of private equity comes from the fact that private equity firms underestimate
the comovement between private equity and market returns.
Nowwe can replaceRTNit in equation 1.1 withSRit, and run the regression in equation
1.6. The parameter of interest is 01. If ^01 is positive and significantly different from zero,
it means that after adjusting for the risk, bigger endowments still outperform smaller ones.
Then, besides the risk channel, the information channel must have contributed to the better
performance. Otherwise, the risk channel dominates. In other words, there is no secret





1 lnENDOWit + 2012t=20030tyeart + "it (1.6)
Table 1.8 shows the regression results of equation 1.6. The upper panel presents the
results with the full sample from 2003 to 2013 with different values for decay parameter
.17 Although the coefficient 01 is not statistically significant at a level of 90 percent, the
estimates are negative. This tells us after controlling for the risk that the bigger endowments
perform no better than the smaller ones, and perhaps even underperform the smaller ones.
If we concentrate the estimation on the endowments that are under $1 billion, this negative
correlation between the Sharpe ratio and size becomes even larger for any given .
17Note that  = 1 is the usual case of a constant mean and standard deviation.
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Table 1.8: Regression of Sharpe Ratio on Size
 = 0:99  = 0:84  = 0:7
Full Sample 2003-2013
LENDOW -0.97 -1.03 -1.41
S.E. .99 .98 1.09
Obs. (948, 7162) (948, 7162) (948, 7162)
Exclude Endow > 1b 2003-2013
LENDOW -1.13 -1.18 -1.61
S.E. 1.12 1.11 1.23
Obs. (908, 6573) (908, 6573) (908, 6573)
 is the decay parameter.
Standard error is heteroscedasticity-consistent, and clustered by university endowment.
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
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There are other pieces of evidence that risk plays a very important role in determining
the capital return for university endowments. Figure 1.2 represents a stable pattern that the
bigger an endowment gets, the less weight is allocated to the fixed income. Indeed, Figure
1.3 reveals that the bigger endowments put more weight on international equity compared
to smaller ones. Although after the 2008 financial crisis, the biggest endowments have
lowered the allocation in risky international equities, they still put more weight in them
than the smaller endowments. Table 1.9 tells us that the international equity is one of the
most volatile assets, while the fixed income is of very low risk.
Figure 1.2: Mean Allocation of Fixed Income of Different Size of Endowments
Small $100 million and under, medium $100 million - $500 million, big over $500 million
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
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Figure 1.3: Mean Allocation of International Equity of Different Size of Endowments
Small $100 million and under, medium $100 million - $500 million, big over $500 million
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
Figure 1.4 shows the year-to-year regression result of RTN on lnENDOW . The co-
efficient ^1 varies a lot. But the general pattern is that when the market is in a boom, the
correlation between return and size is positive, such as 2000 and 2004 - 2008.18 When the
market is in a recession, the positive correlation disappears. In year 2009, this correlation
is even reversed. This suggests that the bigger endowments may just surf on the wave of
the market and expose themselves to more market risk.
18The NACUBO data is collected every year in June. Therefore, year 2008 is still considered to be in an
economic boom.
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Table 1.9: Standard Deviation of Benchmark Indexes Quarterly Return
year DE FI EQI PE ALT VC RE EN COM DD CASH
2000 10.4 1.7 9.7 . 5.9 . 0.84 . 7.6 5.1 0.17
2001 9.9 1.8 9.7 . 5.2 . 0.90 . 7.2 4.4 0.22
2002 11.4 2.0 10.0 . 4.0 . 1.4 . 7.6 3.5 0.43
2003 10.9 1.8 11.2 . 3.1 . 1.0 10.5 6.0 3.7 0.46
2004 9.8 2.0 11.7 . 2.6 . 0.85 10.5 6.5 3.8 0.40
2005 7.4 2.0 9.4 . 2.5 . 1.2 8.4 7.8 3.3 0.31
2006 5.4 1.9 7.8 . 2.4 . 1.3 9.0 8.5 2.8 0.35
2007 4.5 1.8 6.1 . 2.5 . 0.98 8.1 7.0 2.3 0.38
2008 5.1 1.8 6.1 . 2.8 . 1.7 11.7 9.3 3.1 0.36
2009 9.4 2.1 12.8 . 5.9 . 7.0 16.4 17.0 7.1 0.48
2010 11.6 1.8 15.2 . 5.2 . 6.4 14.5 13.6 8.0 0.45
2011 10.8 1.9 13.5 . 4.1 . 5.9 14.4 12.3 5.9 0.35
2012 12.3 1.6 13.6 . 3.8 . 4.4 13.8 10.1 5.7 0.26
2013 9.9 1.6 10.7 . 3.2 . 3.1 10.9 8.6 4.9 0.19
Mean 9.2 1.8 10.5 . 3.8 . 2.3 11.7 9.2 4.5 0.34
Domestic Equities(DE), Fixed Income(FI), International Equities(EQI), Private Equity(PE), Mar-
ketable Alternatives(ALT), Venture Capital(VC), Real Estate(RE), Energy and Natural Re-
sources(EN), Commodities(COM), Distressed Debt(DD), Short-Term Securities/Cash(CASH)
From publicly available benchmark indexes
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Figure 1.4: Year-to-Year Regression Coefficient of RTN on LENDOW
to year regression result.png to year regression result.bb
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
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Controlling for the Information Channel
In this subsection, I present a method to explicitly control for the information channel. The
takeaway message is that the information channel is negligible relative to the risk channel
in determining capital return inequality. In the previous subsection, I demonstrate that risk
channel dominates the contribution to capital return inequality.
The main assumption is that benchmark indexes contain all the public information and
university endowments deviate from the benchmarks because they own some private in-
formation. If each endowment simply relies on the public information and traces only
benchmarks, the synthetic return and the actual return should be exactly the same. And
the coefficient ^1 should be the same as well, using either the synthetic return or the ac-
tual return in regression (1). The discrepancy between synthetic return and actual return
demonstrates that some endowments deviate from the benchmark indexes. And we do see
in Table 1.7 that after excluding the endowments above $1 billion, the coefficient ^1 ob-
tained with the synthetic return is much closer to that of the actual return. This piece of
evidence suggests that bigger endowments deviate more from the benchmark indexes than
smaller ones.
Therefore, I construct a proxy for the private information in equation 1.7:
jDiff jit = jRTNit  RTN synit j (1.7)
The absolute value in equation 1.7 comes from the assumption that no endowment can
have less information than the publicly available market information. This proxy for the
31
private information is not perfect though. It would be ideal to know the disaggregate return
of individual assets for each endowment. Then we can use the difference between actual
return of asset a and the benchmark return of asset a as a proxy for an endowments’ private
information in a particular type of asset. From there, we could aggregate to construct the
total private information. However, the data at my disposal is only total return.
Including the proxy of the private information in panel regression, we now have regres-
sion equations 1.8:





1 lnENDOWit + 02jDiff jit 1 + 2012t=20040tyeart + "it
(1.8)
The reason to use jDiff jit 1 instead of jDiff jit is to avoid the potential endogeneity
problem in the regressions.
The results of regression (8) are reported in the upper panel of Table 1.10 , and the
results of regression (9) in the lower panel. The loading on the information channel ^2 and
^02 is negative and close to zero.
It is difficult to compare ^1 and ^2 directly since the variables lnENDOW and Diff
have different units. However, we can compare their separate contributions to the capital
income inequality. Since the information channel is controlled, the residual loading on size
can be considered to be the loading on the risk channel in equations 1.8.
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Table 1.10: Regression of Return and Sharpe Ratio on Size and Information
Dep. Indep. Full Sample Exclude Endow > 1b
RTN LENDOW 2.29(.608) 2.53(.645)
L.Diff -.040(.0169) - .045(.0176)
SR LENDOW -1.63(1.590) -1.75(1.706)
L.Diff -.054(.046) -.063(0.056)
Obs. (867, 5888) (819, 5342)
The decay parameter is  = 0:84 in this table.
Standard Error is heteroscedasticity-consistent, and clustered by university endowment.
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
In the whole data set, the largest 10 percent of the endowments have an average
lnENDOW = 21:91, while the smallest 10 percent yield lnENDOW = 16:05. There-
fore, the size difference between the two groups is 5:86, and the contribution of the risk
channel to the return difference of the two groups is 5:86 ^1 = 13:4%. The information
channel difference between the same two groups is 1.65, which indicates that the informa-
tion channel contribution to the return differences is merely 1:65 ^2 =  0:066%.
There is even more evidence supporting the conclusion that the information channel
plays little role in determining capital return inequality. First, I run the year- to-year regres-
sion as in equation 1.9,
RTNt =  + 1 lnENDOWt + 2jDiff jt 1 + "t (1.9)
This is not a panel regression anymore, so there is no fixed effect. The regression result
can be used to compute the time-varying contribution of different channels to the capi-
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tal return inequality. Figure 1.5 represents the contribution of two channels to the return
difference between the top decile endowments and bottom decile ones in terms of the en-
dowment size. The curve representing the information channel is close to zero compared
to the other representing the risk channel. In some years, such as 2012 and 2013, the infor-
mation channel is indeed comparable to the risk channel, but the contribution of the former
is nonetheless negative.
Figure 1.5: Year-to-Year Contribution to Return Difference between Two Channels
to year regression result 2.png to year regression result 2.bb
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
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Second, I run the regression as shown in equation 1.10:
Diffit = i + 1 lnENDOWit + 2012t=2003tyeart + "it (1.10)
The dependent variable is Diffit, not the absolute value. The idea is that if the private
information has little impact on the capital return, public information should capture most
of the variation of the returns. So the discrepancy between the actual return and synthetic
return (or the excess return) should not depend on endowment size. Table 1.11 shows this
link does exist: The coefficient ^theta1 is not statistically different from zero. After exclud-
ing forty of the largest university endowments with size above $1 billion, the coefficient is
virtually zero.
Table 1.11: Regression of Excess Return on Size
Dep. Indep. Full Sample Exclude Endow > 1b
Diff LENDOW 0.23(.38) 0.08(.38)
Obs. (948, 7162) (908,6573)
The decay parameter is  = 0:84 in this table.
Standard error is heteroscedasticity-consistent, and clustered by university endowment.
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
1.5 Robustness Check
In this section, I show alternative evidence that also supports the view that the risk channel
rather than the information channel determines capital return inequality.
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Total (static) Sharpe Ratio
In this subsection, I deal with the concern that the risk measured as the weighted volatility
of the excess return of benchmark indexes only captures the variation of between-asset
allocation, while ignoring the within-asset allocation. For example, let us say there are two
endowments have the same allocation of portfolio in terms of eleven explicit asset types:
Both put 50 percent in domestic equities and 50 percent in bond, and zero in all other assets.
Based on this measure of risk, we would conclude that they have the same risk. However, it
could be that one endowment allocates all the weight of domestic equities in riskier stocks
and the other in safer stocks. So the true risk they face could potentially be very different.
I present an alternative risk measure and an alternative Sharpe ratio to alleviate the





The superscript of Sharpe ratio T means that this measure takes the total risk into consid-
eration. And since it is not a time-varying variable, there is no time subscription t. RTN i
stands for the time average of total net return of endowment i from year 2000 to 2013. Rf
is the time average return of the US government’s three-month treasury bills from the same
period. ETi is the total volatility, measured as the standard deviation of excess return of
endowment i. I call SRTi the total Sharpe ratio and ETi the total volatility or the total risk.
In this setting, there is no panel data. The data set is degenerated into a purely cross-
section one. The X axes of Figures 1.6 and 1.7 are the same, the time average of endowment
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size;19 while the Y axes are respectively RTN i and SRTi . In order to ensure that the stan-
dard deviation makes sense, I only keep the endowment that has at least 3 observations in
the dataset.
Figure 1.6: Average Return vs. Average Size
Each point in the graph stands for an endowment.
Only endowments with at least three observations are included.
Three outliers are excluded from the graph. If They were included, the slope is slightly bigger:
slope = 0.46(0.051)
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
The slope of the two graphs and the corresponding t-statistics are also specified in the
southwest corner. The correlation between the average return and average size is both pos-
itive and statistically significant. Moreover the numeric value 0.45 is close to the result
19The endowment is measured in log term.
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Figure 1.7: Alternative Sharpe Ratio vs. Average Size
Each point in the graph stands for an endowment.
Only endowments with at least three observations are included.
Three outliers are excluded from the graph. If They were included, the slope would become slightly
negative: slope = -0.019(0.020)
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
in column 2 of Table 1.4. However, after we control for the risk, Figure 1.7 shows no
correlation between the size and the Sharpe ratio.
Explicit Risk Channel vs. Explicit Information Channel
In this subsection, I explicitly show the regression of return on both the risk channel and
the information channel, rather than treating the risk channel as a residual channel as in
equations 1.8.
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(1.12)
The difference between the two equations above is the standard deviation used. The
second equation uses Eit , which is the same as is defined in equations 1.5, The superscript
E stands for the excess return of the endowment return in comparison to the risk-free asset.





it. The superscript E is dropped to indicate that it is no longer the excess
return but the actual return of the benchmark indexes that is involved in the calculation of
the risk. The computation of it is shown in equation 1.13
ma+1 = ma + (1  )Ra
va = Ra  ma
2a+1 = 
2
a + (1  )v2a
ab+1 = ab + (1  )vavb
(1.13)
where  is the decay parameter, ma is the moving average of the return of the bench-
mark index a, and vat is the deviation of the return of asset a from the mean. The initial
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values of iteration,ma0, a0, and ab0, are the long run values. Actually, since the return of
risk free asset is very stable, it is very similar to Eit .
The results are shown in Table 1.12. No matter which risk measurement is used, the
load on the risk channel does not vary much and is around 0.60. And the load on the
information channel is around -0.065. The average contribution of the risk channel to the
return is therefore 3.27 percent, while that of the information channel is merely 0.6 percent.
Table 1.12: Regression of Return on the Risk Channel and Information Channel
Dep. Indep. Full Sample Exclude Endow > 1b
RTN  .60(.101) .59(.106)
L.Diff -.065(.0165) -.066(.0182)
RTN E .62(.100) .61(.106)
L.Diff -.066(.0165) -.067(.0182)
Obs. (867, 5888) (819, 5342)
The decay parameter is  = 0:84 in this table.
Standard Error is heteroscedasticity-consistent, and clustered by university endowment.
NACUBO Endowment-level Data
1.6 Conclusion
I would like to conclude my paper with a story written by Mark Twain in 1906 called
$30,000 Bequest. Living through theGildedAge in theUS, whichwas the last three decades
of nineteenth century, Twain witnessed the increasing inequality of that era. His story is
about a middle-class couple with an annual income of $800 in a small town. Their typical
investment was to buy land and then resell it to newcomers to the town. One day, they
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heard from their distant uncle that they would get a $30,000 bequest after he died. Merely
the news itself was already enough for them to make bolder investment strategies. With
the vain hope that they would someday have such a huge amount of money, they started to
envision investing in very risky assets, such as coal mines and stocks. They did not have
more information on those assets and were simply attracted by the higher return. Alas, of
course, this was only a dream for them. They did not receive any bequest from their uncle
since he had died years before. The point of the story is to show that people are willing
to bear more risk in investments once they become richer and this is consistent with the
empirical finding in this paper that higher capital return comes from more risk.
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Chapter 2
TFP Declines: Misallocation or Mismeasurement?
2.1 Introduction
The Eurozone integration (officially started in 1999, expectation started in 1996) was ac-
companied by plummeting of borrowing cost and continuing deterioration of the current
accounts in Spain and other southern European countries, as shown in Figure 2.1. The
economy was booming, but its measured total factor productivity (TFP) was decreasing.
Researchers and policy makers often blame this negative correlation between the expan-
sion of the economy and TFP growth on capital/resource misallocation. The idea is that the
cheap credit flowed more into less productive firms and the compositional change of the
economy brought down the average productivity.
This paper challenges the view that the misallocation channel is the main explanation
for the TFP drop, and it proposes that the labor-quality mismeasurement channel is a more
reasonable explanation. The labor-quality mismeasurement channel ascribes the measured
TFP drop to the lower efficiency of the incoming labor compared to the existing labor force
in expanding sectors. The idea is that the TFP calculation does not fully capture labor
quality, which is automatically translated to the TFP measured as a residual. Although
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Figure 2.1: Interest Rate Spread and Current Account
Raw data: WDI
The definition of spread: the difference between the bond yield of Spain and Germany
the labor quality can be measured to some extent with limited observable characteristics,
such as education, age, and gender, other dimensions such as tenure are usually not widely
observed.
The argument for labor-quality mismeasurement channel is developed in five steps.
First, I show that TFP decline is much more severe in expanding sectors (such construction
and real sector) than in relatively stable sectors (such as manufacturing), using both aggre-
gate data and firm-level data. The aggregate TFP data is from Klems, calculated under the
assumption of the constant return to scale. The firm-level TFP is calculated using Amadeus
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data obtained from vintage discs. The firm-level TFPmeasurement methodologies are built
on Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 and De Loecker 2011.1 Although constant return to scale is
not imposed in the firm-level TFP estimation, the result is very close to it.
Second, the growth of dispersion of the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK)
suggests there is more misallocation of capital in non-expanding sectors than in expanding
sectors. Using firm-level data, I demonstrate that the growth of dispersion of the MRPK is
more significant in non-expanding sectors than in expanding sectors. The dispersion of the
MRPK is usually considered as an indication of the capital misallocation following Chang-
Tai Hsieh 2009, and it serves as the main evidence for the papers (such as Gopinath et al.
Forthcoming, and Garcia-Santana et al. 2016) arguing that capital misallocation caused the
TFP stagnation problem in southern Europe. If capital misallocation is the real explana-
tion of the TFP drop, we should observe more growth of the dispersion of the MRPK in
expanding sectors than in non-expanding sectors. 2
Third, decomposition of the TFP growth indicates that the between-firm TFP growth is
negligible compared to the within-firm growth in the sub-sample of stayers. Compared to
the dispersion growth of the MRPK, this is a more direct piece of evidence showing that the
capital misallocation channel cannot be the main explanation, but the labor-quality mismea-
surement channel can be. If capital misallocation is the main channel, we should observe
1I only discuss the mismeasurement of the labor quality but not the mismeasurement of the capital quality
is because studies like Sakellaris and Wilson 2004, show that newly invested capital has, on average, higher
quality than the existing one. Therefore, if we take into account capital quality mismeasurement, then the
TFP growth paths of the expanding sectors and non-expanding sectors would be even more divergent.
2There are papers that both support Chang-Tai Hsieh 2009 and argue against it. Whether dispersion of the
MRPK is a goodmeasure of the capital misallocation or not, the misallocation channel as the main explanation
for the TFP drop is inconsistent with data.
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that resources move more into less productive firms. In other words, the decomposition
result should reveal that between-firm TFP change accounts for the lion’s share of the TFP
drop. The data shows otherwise: both in expanding sectors and in non-expanding sectors,
the between-firm change of TFP is miniscule. The within-firm TFP change accounts for
one-third of the total TFP drop in expanding sectors but increased slightly in expanding
sectors. This observation is consistent with the labor-quality mismeasurement channel.
Fourth, using the worker-firmmatched data, I establish that the limited observable char-
acteristics of workers are not sufficient to control for labor quality and that labor quality be-
yond education, age and gender deteriorates in expanding sectors but not in non-expanding
sectors. The worker-firm matched dataset is from the Eurostat Structure of Earnings Sur-
vey. The characteristics that KLEMS dataset employs to control for labor quality are ed-
ucation, age and gender, which only account for one-third of the wage variation in the
manufacturing sector and less than 20 percent of the wage variation in the construction
sector. Worker’s tenure (which can be thought as an imperfect proxy for experience), es-
pecially that of firm managers, has decreased significantly in expanding sectors but has
increased in non-expanding sectors. Moreover, the distribution of unobserved labor quality
is backed out by taking out firm fixed effects and observed labor characteristics from the
real hourly wage, which can be fed into the model later. More specifically, by running the
regression of hourly wage on firm characteristics, the distribution of the residual is taken
as the distribution of labor quality.
Last but not least, I build a model featuring both the misallocation channel and the mis-
measurement channel and calibrate it using the micro-level data. The model shows that
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once the labor quality mismeasurement is properly measured, the TFP drop is small. The
model works as follows: a negative interest rate shock (Eurozone integration) enables low-
productivity firms in the non-tradable sector to enter the production by borrowing. This
brings down the average productivity of this sector. Moreover, borrowing costs for non-
tradable firms are also lowered and allows them to borrow more; thus, the sector expands.
The tradable sector is not affected by the shock, since it is assumed that the tradable firms
are far less financially constrained. Therefore, there is no expansion in this sector. The
expansion in the non-tradable sector increases base wage and attracts the labor from the
tradable sector. The marginal worker entering the non-tradable sector is less efficient com-
pared to the average existing workers, while the way the TFP is calculated treats incoming
workers the same as the existing ones. So, the lower efficiency of the worker is translated
into lower measured TFP. The existence of the mismeasurement channel makes the true
TFP drop much less acute than the measured TFP suggests.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to a body of work that studies the mea-
sured TFP drop during the Eurozone integration period. Compared to the papers that argue
capital misallocation is the main channel for measured TFP drop, this paper studies an addi-
tional labor quality mismeasurement channel and finds it to be more important. Reis 2013,
Calligaris 2015, Dias, Marques, and Richmond 2016, Garcia-Santana et al. 2016, Cette,
Fernald, and Mojon 2016 and Gopinath et al. Forthcoming all argue that capital misallo-
cation is the main reason that TFP has declined in southern Europe. Cette, Fernald, and
Mojon 2016 provides aggregate evidence based on VAR analysis that interest rate drop
triggers the productivity decline. But this correlation between negative interest rate shock
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and productivity change is consistent with the mechanism in my model as well. Calligaris
2015 and Gopinath et al. Forthcoming both use firm-level data and provide evidence that
removing the heterogeneity of productivity can substantially increase the aggregate pro-
ductivity substantially. The analysis, however, is restricted to the manufacturing sector
and thus ignores the significant difference between expanding sectors and non-expanding
sectors. Dias, Marques, and Richmond 2016 and Garcia-Santana et al. 2016 extend the
misallocation to multiple sectors with administrative data. However Dias, Marques, and
Richmond 2016 provides only the dispersion of the productivity, which is not necessarily
due to capital misallocation. Garcia-Santana et al. 2016 posits that more government influ-
ence is associated with more misallocation. Reis 2013 argues that capital misallocation in
the non-tradable sector is more severe than that in the tradable sector based on the inference
from aggregate data.
There are alternative theories explaining the TFP drop during the Eurozone integration
period. Benigno and Fornaro 2014 assumes that labor employed by the tradable sector has
a learning-by-exporting effect which depends on the size of employment due to the positive
externality. This theory is based on the assumption that the tradable sector has to shrink in
the absolute term, while in the data we observe only the relative shrinkage of the tradable
sector. Antonia Diaz 2016 shows the correlation between the governmental subsidy to
residential structure purchase and the TFP drop. It takes the measured TFP drop as given
and estimates the subsidy has to be 50 percent of the price of residential structure to generate
the observed TFP dynamics. Challe, Lopez, and Mengus 2016 argues the decline of the
quality of institution due to the capital inflow can explain the dismal TFP performance.
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However, it does not distinguish the institutional quality among different sectors.
The labor quality mismeasurement channel in my model can be linked to two bodies
of work. Theoretically, I incorporate the partial equilibrium model of Young 2014 into
a general equilibrium model. The economic narrative that labor quality in an expanding
sector could deteriorate dates back to Roy 1951. The empirical part in this paper is very
related to the analysis pioneered by Abowd and Kramarz 1999 using worker-firm matched
data. Card et al. 2016 is a recent paper in the same literature. These papers argue that wage
variation can be decomposed to firm characteristics and worker characteristics.
Other papers address the connection between the business cycles and the quality of the
labor force. My paper discusses the labor quality deterioration during a boom of the econ-
omy. Solon, Barsky, and Parker 1994 finds that true procyclicality of real wage is obscured
in aggregate time series because of a composition bias due to more low-skill workers dur-
ing expansions. Mulligan 2011 studies the higher labor productivity during the recession of
2008-9, and part of the reason is that the remaining labor force had higher quality relative
to that before the recession. Mueller 2017 shows that in recessions the pool of unemployed
tends to have workers with higher quality.
Another strand of literature to which my paper connects to is the literature of firm-level
TFP measure. My estimation of firm-level TFP follows methodologies in Levinsohn and
Petrin 2003, De Loecker 2011 and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2015. The origin of the
literature can be traced back to Olley and Pakes 1996. The firm-level TFP measure in
my paper confirms the widely studied phenomenon of the very dispersed firm-level TFP
measure discussed thoroughly in Syverson 2011.
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My paper also links to the literature studying whether static dispersion of the MRPK is
a good measure of capital misallocation. Chang-Tai Hsieh 2009 argues that it is a very good
indicator of capital misallocation and that reducing dispersion could lead to a productivity
increase and an output boost. However, there are papers arguing that other reasons could
lead to the dispersion of the MRPK. For example DeLoeckeretal2014 finds that capital
adjustment cost can explain 80-90 percent of the cross-industry and cross-country variation
in the dispersion of the MRPK. Bils, Klenow, and Ruane 2017 finds that measurement error
plays a big role in explaining measured misallocation. My paper does not take a stand in
this debate. Whether the dispersion of theMRPK is a goodmeasure of capital misallocation
or not, I instead show that the misallocation channel cannot explain the TFP drop during
the Eurozone integration period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 shows stylized facts
using aggregate data and calculates the dual measure of the TFP to argue against a possible
explanation that measured TFP growth reflects the markup growth. Section 2.3 employs the
Spainish firm-level data to show that capital misallocation is not the right explanation and
that labor-quality mismeasurement might be the dominant channel. Section 2.4 provides
evidence that labor quality does deteriorate in expanding sectors but not in non-expanding
sectors. Section 2.5 presents the model. Section 2.6 shows the calibration and the numerical
result. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Aggregate Time Series Evidence on TFP Decline
In this section, I show using aggregate data that measured TFP declined or stagnated, espe-
cially for expanding sectors .
The aggregate time series data presented in this section are from KLEMS. The KLEMS
dataset estimates the TFP mainly for European countries on the two-digit sectoral level. It
has different release dates, the one used here is the 2009 release3. There are two reasons
why I use the 2009 release instead of releases of other years. First, the 2009 release provides
the best combination of the temporal coverage and geographical coverage. Since this paper
primarily studies the booming period before the 2008 great recession, the 2009 release, with
observations until 2007, fits the purpose very well. Moreover, the 2009 release has a lot
more geographical coverage, as it includes countries such as Japan and Korea. The two
countries experienced booms in certain sectors during the 1990s. Then we can see if what
we observe in Europe can be observed elsewhere in a different time period. Second, the
2009 release is the latest release that divides the sector based on the ISIC Rev.3 or NACE
1.1 standard, which is in perfect consistency with the firm-level data that I will show in the
next section.
Primal Measure of TFP
The TFP estimation method used in the KLEMS dataset is the primal measure. It assumes
that the production function is a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas function. Thus, the
3The newest release is 2016. Before that, there were the 2012 release, the 2009 release, the 2008 release
and the 2007 release.
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TFP growth will be measured as the growth rate of the Solow-residual:
 lnAst =  lnYst   sKst lnKst   sLst lnLst,
Constant return to scale implies sLst + sKst = 1. Capital stock is measured using the per-
petual inventory model, and labor is measured by the limited quality adjusted labor index.
We will discuss more how the labor measured is problematic in terms of labor quality con-
trol. O’Mahony and Timmer 2009 provides more detailed information about how KLEMS
measures aggregate sectoral level TFP.
Figure 2.2 plots the sectoral level GDP, capital stock, labor employment and TFP. The
black dash-dot line represents for the total industry, the red dotted line the manufacturing
sector, the blue solid line the construction sector and the green dashed line the real estate
sector.
Subfigures (a) and (b) show that the expansion of the manufacturing sector was mild in
any measure compared to that of the construction sector and the real estate sector. In 2007,
the real capital stock in the construction sector was almost five times higher than that of
1999; labor employment was almost two times higher. Contrastingly, the manufacturing
sector stayed stable. The real capital stock increased nearly 40 percent, and labor employ-
ment barely 3 percent. Now turning to the GDP growth in subfigure (c), the difference
between the construction sector and the manufacturing sector is much smaller, a 75 percent
increase for the former, and a 30 percent increase for the latter. The trends in the subfig-
ures (a), (b) and (c) give rise to the measured TFP trend in subfigure (d). The TFP of the
construction sector dropped by more than 10 percent in less than 10 years, while that of the
manufacturing sector declined by very little.
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1999 TFP is normalized to 100
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Evidence from more countries shows that the same phenomenon is not only observed
in Spain, but also in other southern European countries as well. In all the four countries4
presented in Table 2.1, there exists a negative correlation between the sectoral expansion
and the TFP growth. On the left panel of Table 2.1, I list the three most expanded sectors
on the one-digit level in terms of the relative labor growth; on the right panel, I list the
three least expanded sectors for Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy. One striking difference
is that the measured TFP declines much more for the sectors experiencing relatively greater
expansion.
Searching in the KLEMS dataset results in a finding of three other countries/periods
experiencing a huge drop of TFP in fast expansionary sector: Finland from 1984 to 1990,
Japan from 1986 to 1991, and Korea from 1988 to 1997. I choose the period systematically:
the stopping point is the year before the documented year of the crisis, and the starting point
is the year when current account trend reverses. In Table 2.2, I list the two most expanded
sectors on the left panel, and the manufacturing sector on the right panel. Sandal 2004
documents the Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990s in Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
It attributes the cause to the strong credit and asset price booming before that. There is
a huge expansion of real estate sector such that the relative employment increases 4.0%
annually between 1984 and 1990 in Finland,5 with an annual TFP drop at 2.64 percent. The
annualized growth rate of relative employment of manufacturing sector is -2.68 percent,
while the TFP increases at 3.13 percent per year. Shiratsuka 2005 documents the asset price
4They are four countries in the GIIPS group. Greece is not presented due to data availability.
5Norway is not in the KLEMS 2009 release and the data of Sweden does not date back to the early 1980s.
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bubble in Japan in the 1980s. The same observation appears again, as a fast-expanding
real estate sector coexists with negative measured TFP growth. Radelet and Sachs 1998
analyzes the East Asia financial crisis and its prelude, in which an expanding real estate
sector and hotel/restaurant sector have experience a continuous measured TFP decline.
Table 2.1: Expansion and TFP Growth (1999 - 2007 Annualized)
Most expanding Least expanding
Countries Sectors  ln Lst
Lt
(%)  lnTFPst (%) Sectors  ln LstLt (%)  lnTFPst (%)
Portugal
Real estate 2.57 -4.81 Utility -5.51 -0.29
Hotels & Restaurants 1.66 -2.43 Finance -3.12 4.32
Wholesale & Retail 1.39 -2.38 Manufacturing -2.59 -0.72
Spain
Construction 3.36 -1.7 Mining & Quarrying -4.29 0.52
Real estate 2.18 -1.22 Manufacturing -2.98 -0.14
Hotels & Restaurant 1.94 -2.63 Utility -2.21 0.19
Ireland
Construction 4.82 -2.74 Agriculture -7.76 2.25
Community service 1.45 -1.84 Utility -4.41 -0.42
Mining & Quarrying 0.93 -0.87 Manufacturing 1.31 4.93
Italy
Real estate 3.35 -0.71 Utility -2.59 -0.13
Construction 2.67 -1.21 Agriculture -1.55 -0.55
Hotels & Restaurant 2.56 -2.27 Manufacturing -1.48 -0.13
Raw data: KLEMS
All the numbers are in percentages. The growth rate of Portugal is calculated between 1999 and 2005, others 1999 - 2007
* For Ireland, Mining & Quarrying is the fourth most expanded sector. For Italy, Manufacturing is the fifth least expanded sector.
Table 2.2: Other Booming Periods (Annualized)
Most expanding Least expanding
Countries Sectors  ln Lst
Lt
(%)  lnTFPst (%) Sectors  ln LstLt (%)  lnTFPst (%)
Finland Real estate 4.0 -2.64 Manufacturing -2.68 3.13
(1984-1990) Community services 1.75 -0.7
Japan Real estate 4.48 -2.14 Manufacturing -0.41 3.82
(1986-1991) Hotels & Restaurants 1.51 -1.27
Korea Real estate 11.72 -2.09 Manufacturing -4.26 4.20
(1988-1997) Hotels & Restaurants 9.89 -2.86
Raw data: KLEMS
All the numbers are in percentages.
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Dual Measure of TFP
In this subsection, I show that the dual measure of TFP tracks the primal measure well,
which is consistent with the perfect competition assumption.
In the previous subsection, it is assumed that sLst + sKst = 1. One implication of this
assumption is that the market is perfectly competitive: the labor share and capital share
adds up to one, so that there is no profit. The concern then is that this assumption is too
strong. A valid suspicion is that the decline in the measured TFP in expanding sectors may
not reflect the drop of the productivity, but merely a drop of the markup if the market is not
perfectly competitive.
According to Hsieh 2002,6 with the assumption that the market is perfectly competitive,
there exists an identity:7
Y^st   sKstK^   sLstL^st| {z }
Primal: A^Pst





The left-hand side of equation 2.1 is the primal measure, which in principle is the mea-
sure used in KLEMS. The right-hand side of equation 2.1 is the dual measure, r^st is the
growth rate of the rental price of capital, and w^st is the growth rate of wage. sKst and sLst are
respectively the capital share and the labor share.
If the market is not perfectly competitive, the output should be divided into factor shares
6Hsieh 2002 shows that in the cases of Singapore and Taiwan, the dual measure does not matches the
primal measure well. He does not question the validity of the specification of the assumption of market
condition, but instead questions the quality of national account. In the case of European data, however, the
data quality is much less of a concern.
7The derivation of the equation can be found in Appendix 3.7.
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and profit:
Yst = rstKst + wstLst + st (2.2)
where st is the profit of sector s at time t.
Then we have a similar expression as in equation 2.1:
Y^st   (1  sLst)K^st   sLstL^st| {z }
Primal: A^Pst




st   s^Kst) (2.3)
Equation 2.3 shows that if we still mistakenly assume that the labor share and the capital
share sums up to one if the truth is not, the primal measure would exceed the dual measure
by sst(s^st   s^Kst).
In Figure 2.3a, I show that the dual measure and the primal measure of the TFP of Spain
are indeed very close to each other. In Figure 2.3b, I present the scatter plot of the primal
measure versus the dual measure for the seven countries/periods explored in the previous
subsection. Every dot represents the annualized TFP growth for that country during the
period associated. The red solid line is the linearly fitted line of the scatter plot, and the
black dashed line is the 45-degree line. The closeness of the two lines indicates that the two
measures matches each other very well.
A more specific way to read Figure 2.3 is that the term sst(s^st   s^Kst) in equation 2.3
is small. And Figure 2.4 proves it is because the profit share sst is small, which further
implies that the competitive market assumption is a reasonable one. Indeed, if sst(s^st  s^Kst)
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is small is due to the fact that the difference between the growth rate of capital share and
that of profit share (s^st   s^Kst) is small, then we would expect the labor share to increase.
The reason is that attributing the measured TFP decline to markup drop would require profit
share to decrease as well. Then the capital share would need to decline at about the same
rate. The combination of the decline in capital share and the decline in profit share requires
the labor share to increase. However, Figure 2.4 shows that the labor share is actually
decreasing in Spain.
Figure 2.3: Primal Measure and Dual Measure
(a) (b)
Raw data: KLEMS
1999 TFP is normalized to 100
Next to every dot there are three letters and numbers; the three letters stands for countries, and the
numbers are the starting and end years: PRT99-05 (Portugal 1999 -2005), ESP99-07(Spain 1999
- 2007), ITA99-07 (Italy 1999 - 2007), IRL99-07(Ireland 1999 - 2007), FIN84-90 (Finland 1984 -
1990), JPN86-91 (Japan 1986 - 1991), KOR88-97 (Korea 1988 - 1997)
Portugal data is from 1999 - 2005 is because of data availability in the the release of the 2009 version
of KLEMS.
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Figure 2.4: Labor Share of Spain
Raw data: KLEMS
2.3 Firm-level Evidence on TFP Decline
In this section, I show that the trend of TFP observed in aggregate data also exists in the firm-
level data using very different estimation methods. Moreover, the firm-level data suggests
that the capital misallocation channel cannot explain the TFP drop, but the labor-quality
mismeasurement channel can.
Firm-level data used in this section are the AMADEUS firm-level panel data of Spain
from 1999 to 2007. I describe how I construct the dataset in Appendix 3.7.
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Then I merge the price data to the firm-level data. The ideal price data would be firm-
level producer price. However, it is not available. The price data used in the paper are the
two-digit sectoral level data of nominal value added and intermediate inputs from KLEMS
ISIC 3. 2009 release. The price data of fixed assets are quasi two-digit sectoral level data
from the same source. Some two-digit sectors share the same price index of fixed assets.
For example, food/beverage and tobacco are two different two-digit sectors, but they have
the identical price index of fixed assets.
Capital Misallocation
In this subsection, I prove that the capital misallocation channel is not the channel of the
first-order importance to explain the TFP drop. More specifically, I show that the growth
of the dispersion of the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) is higher in non-
expanding sectors relative to expanding sectors.
The calculation of the MRPK follows Chang-Tai Hsieh 2009 and Gopinath et al. Forth-
coming. The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas: Yist = AistKsistL
s
ist.
Here it is not necessary that the production function is constant return to scale, but it is
assumed to be time invariant. The MRPK is defined as follows:
MRPKist : ss PistYistKist (2.4)
where s is the time invariant mark-up of sector s, Pist is the price of the output of
firm i in sector s at time t. If it is perfect competition, then s = 1. If it is monopolistic
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competition with a CES aggregator, then s = ss 1 , where s is the time invariant elasticity
of substitution.
PistYist is the nominal value-added of the firm calculated as the difference between the
operational income and the material cost. Kist here is defined as the fixed asset deflated by
the capital price from KLEMS, and List is the number of people employed.
The dispersion of the MRPK of sector s is defined as the standard deviation of the log
MRPK:
Dispersion of MRPKst : std(ln(MRPKist)) (2.5)
Here I do not have to assign the values to s, s and s since after taking the log value
of the MRPK, the constant term across all firms within a sector becomes additive. So it
does not add to the variation of the log value of the MRPK.
Figure 2.5 plots the evolution of the dispersion of the MRPK in both the manufacturing
sector and the construction sector. Both curves have an upward trend, but the manufac-
turing sector clearly has a higher growth of the dispersion of the MRPK than that of the
construction sector.
According to Chang-Tai Hsieh 2009, the increasing dispersion of the MRPK is an indi-
cator of the worsening situation of capital misallocation. The idea is that without distortion
on capital allocation the marginal productivity of all firms should be equalized, and there
would be no capital misallocation. Thus, the dispersion of the MRPK should always be
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zero.8
If we focus on just one sector, it is tempting to draw the conclusion that the capital mis-
allocation is increasing within that sector. However, if the capital misallocation channel is
really the main reason TFP drops, we should expect the sector with more TFP drop to expe-
rience a higher growth of the dispersion of the MRPK. However, we observe the opposite
in Figure 2.5.
The main message in this subsection is that the capital misallocation cannot be the main
driver of the TFP drop.
Time Series Trend of TFP
In this subsection, I present the time series trend TFP with firm-level data. It also shows
that average TFP declines much more in expanding sectors than in non-expanding sectors.
This paper estimates the firm-level TFP using different methodologies, which gives
very similar results. More specifically, I employed the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2015
extension of Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 and De Loecker 2011 methodologies. Olley and
Pakes 1996 is often cited side by side with Levinsohn and Petrin 2003. Both papers try to
solve the potential endogeneity problem caused by the correlation between the unobserved
productivity and factor inputs. Olley and Pakes 1996 assumes the investment contains the
information on productivity, while Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 assumes the intermediate
8Even if the dispersion of the MRPK is not necessarily a good measure of capital misallocation, as argued
by DeLoeckeretal2014 and Bils, Klenow, and Ruane 2017, one still needs to reject capital misallocation
as the main explanation for the TFP decline, since almost all the papers favoring the argument of capital
misallocation follow Chang-Tai Hsieh 2009.
61
Figure 2.5: MRPK Dispersion Comparison
Raw data: Amadeus Spain
inputs contain information on productivity. Intermediate inputs could be better than invest-
ment as a proxy for productivity due to the lumpiness of the investment. As pointed out
by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2015, treating labor as a free variable in the first stage
of estimation is problematic because productivity under some data generating processes.
To deal with the concern that the difference between the firm-level price and sectoral-level
price might bias the estimation result, I also include De Loecker 2011 methodology.
The estimation results in Tables 2.3 demonstrates two things: (1) different estimation
methods reveal similar results, and (2) constant return to scale may be a good approxima-
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tion. Table 2.3 shows the coefficient of production function. The upper panel represents
the point estimations, while the lower panel shows the corresponding standard errors. The
left panel is the estimation with the full sample, while the middle panel is the estimation
of the half sample. In the half sample, I exclude the firms with less than or equal to five
observations. So, in the half sample, all firms exist in at least two of the vintage discs. The
right panel is the estimation with the subsample of only stayers. Comparison across sam-
ples shows that the full sample has a higher labor share and a lower capital share relative
to the half sample and subsample of stayers. The production function in the full sample is
closer to constant return to scale.
Figure 2.6 shows a strikingly difference between the trends of the manufacturing sec-
tor and the construction sector: the mean of the log value of TFP of the former declines
little compared to that of the latter. More specifically, Figure 2.6 shows the weighted and
unweighted log value of TFP in the manufacturing and construction sectors, aggregated
from the firm-level TFP measured by the methodologies in Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 and
De Loecker 2011 with the full sample of firms. Horizontally, the first row plots the un-
weighted mean, valued-added-weighted mean, and labor-weighted mean of the log value
TFP of the manufacturing sector using the De Loecker and the Levinsohn-Petrin estimators.
The second row plots the same trends in the construction sector. To make the comparison
more clearer, the third row puts the valued-weighted mean of the log value of TFP of the
two sectors in the same scale. Vertically, the left column and the right shows almost iden-
tical aggregate trends, although there is a slight difference in the point estimation of the
coefficients of the production function. From 1999 to 2007, the average TFP of the manu-
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facturing sector drops from 0.08 to 0.12 log points, depending on the aggregation weights.
Although the decline trend seems similar in the construction sector, the magnitude is much
bigger: the TFP drop is from 0.45 to 0.5 log points. Figure 2.6 further reveals that the
value-weighted mean of the log value of TFP is always above the unweighted mean, which
implies that the higher value-added firms have higher TFP.
One interesting point in Figure 2.6 is the discrepancy between the firm-level TFP trend
and the KLEMS measure. From the firm-level TFP measure, we observe a more profound
TFP drop. This is because the KLEMS measure partially controls the labor quality, while
the firm-level TFP measure does not control for it at all. I will discuss this issue in detail in
the next section.
Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 are copies of Figure 2.6 with different subsamples instead of
the full sample. The divergence of the trends for TFP between the manufacturing sector
and the construction sector is still there, with a sharp drop in the latter and even a slight in-
crease in the former. The magnitude of the drop in the construction sector is much smaller
though in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 compared to that in Figure 2.6, about 0.25 and 0.15, re-
spectively, against about 0.5 measured in log points. This comparison reflects that younger
firms may contributes significantly to the measured TFP drop.
Figure 2.9 is a zoom-in graph of Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8, in the sense that the distribu-
tions of the log value of TFP of two end years are plotted. The mean of the 1999 distribution
of the log value of TFP is normalized to zero. Horizontally, the first row shows the result of
the full sample, the second row that of the half sample, and the third row that of the subsam-
ple of only stayers. Vertically, the first column is the result of distribution of manufacturing
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sector and the second column that of the construction sector.
The pattern that has been observed in Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 can also be observed in
Figure 2.9 by how much the 2007 log TFP distribution changes relative to the 1999 one.
In the left column, the two distribution overlaps with each other quite well, meaning the
aggregate TFP is not that different between 1999 and 2007 in the manufacturing sector. In
the right column, there is a clear move of the distribution to the left, implying a significant
decline of TFP in the construction sector during the same time period.
A new stylized facts that cannot be observed in the aggregate time series is the dispersion
of the TFP. The first row is the distribution based on the full sample. The right tail of the
construction sector extends to the right only slightly, while it stays almost the same for the
manufacturing sector. However, in the construction sector, the left extension of the left tail
is much more pronounced compared to that of the manufacturing sector. The extension
of the left tail can be interpreted as the the entry of the new firms that could not enter the
production procedure without the sector expansion. There are proportionally more firms
like this in the construction sector than in the manufacturing sector because the expansion
scale is very different in the two sectors, as shown in the first section. The second row and
the third row are the distribution based on the half sample and sub sample of only stayers.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Raw data: Amadeus Spain, Full Sample
The left three graphs use the De Loecker estimator, the right three graphs use the Levinsohn and
Petrin estimator.
The mean is normalized such that in year 1999, unweighted mean of lnTFP is zero.
The trend of graph is comparable across all subgraphs. But the levels of lnTFP is comparable only
within the same sector and with same estimation.
In sub-graph 2.4e and 2.4f, I put the va-weighted mean of lnTFP of both manufacturing sector and
construction sector together for a more direct comparison.
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Raw data: Amadeus Spain, Half Sample (obs more than 5)
The left three graphs use the De Loecker estimator, the right three graphs use the Levinsohn and
Petrin estimator.
The mean is normalized such that in year 1999, unweighted mean of lnTFP is zero.
The trend of graph is comparable across all subgraphs. But the levels of lnTFP is comparable only
within the same sector and with same estimation.
In sub-graph 2.4e and 2.4f, I put the va-weighted mean of lnTFP of both manufacturing sector and
construction sector together for a more direct comparison.
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Raw data: Amadeus Spain, Permanent Sample (has obs every year)
The left three graphs use the De Loecker estimator, the right three graphs use the Levinsohn and
Petrin estimator.
The mean is normalized such that in year 1999, unweighted mean of lnTFP is zero.
The trend of graph is comparable across all subgraphs. But the levels of lnTFP is comparable only
within the same sector and with same estimation.
In sub-graph 2.4e and 2.4f, I put the va-weighted mean of lnTFP of both manufacturing sector and
construction sector together for a more direct comparison.
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TFP Growth Decomposition
In this subsection, I present another piece of evidence that the capital misallocation channle
cannot be the main reason TFP drops, but th labor-quality mismeasurement channel can be.
The sectoral average TFP growth can be decomposed into five components: within-firm
term, between-firm term, cross term, entry term and exit term. The first three components
come from the firms that always stay in the sample (sub sample of stayers), the entry term is
from the newly incoming firms, and the exit term is from the firms that exit the sample. The
decomposition result shows that the between-firm component is almost negligible. This
means that capital misallocation is not important in explaining the TFP drop within the
subsample of stayers. The importance of the within-firm component implies consistency
with the mismeasurement channel.
Following Alvarez, Chen, and Li 2017, the change of the weighted average of the log
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value of TFP can be decomposed to five terms, as follows:
















































































where a = lnA, Yst is the total real value added in year t of sector s, and Ysr is its
counterpart in reference year r. Nst is the total number of firms. stay is the subset of firms
that exist both in year t and year r. exit is the subset of firms that exist in the reference year
r but do not in year t, (i.e., firms that exit the sample). enter is the subset of firms that do
not exist in the reference year r but do in year t, (i.e., firms that enter the sample). Y stay
is the total real value added of the subset of firms in stay. Technically speaking, equation
2.6 has one more term: asr
 P
i2stay










, but since we can
normalize asr to be zero, it is ignored.
Then the change of the weighted average of log TFP of year t in sector s relative to the
reference year r can be decomposed into five parts: “within,” “between,” “cross,” “entry”
and “exit.” The “within” term keeps the weight of the reference year unchanged but varies
the TFP of individual firms, so it indeed measures the contribution of the log TFP change
within the same firms that exist both in year t and in reference year r. If we further assume
that on average a firm does not have a TFP drop, then the “within” term measures the TFP
change stemming from the mismeasurement of the labor quality of the firms that survive.
The “between” term keeps the TFP of firms unchanged but varies the weight of indi-
vidual firms. So it indeed measures the relative firm size change due to the reallocation
of the resource. If aBetweenst > 0, it means that high productive firms become larger in
size. If aBetweenst < 0, it means that low productive firms expand more, which means the
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allocation efficiency worsens. If aBetweenst  0, it implies that the misallocation channel
may not be important, at least in the subset of stay firms.
The “cross” term captures the correlation between the change of TFP and change of the
size. IfaCrosssst > 0, it means that when a firm grows in size, it also grows in productivity.
If aCrosssst < 0, it means that a firm expands in size but decreases in productivity.
The “entry” term measures the weighted average of the log TFP of firms that newly
enter the market in year t but do not exit in reference year r. So this term contains the
change both from the misallocation channel and from the mismeasurement channel.
The “exit” term measures the weighted average of the log TFP of firms that exist in
reference year r but do not exist anymore in year t.
Figure 2.10 plots graphically the decomposition based on equation 2.6 between year
2007 and reference year 1999, for both the manufacturing sector and the construction sector.
The navy bars, standing for the total log TFP change in both sectors, echoes the observation
in Figure 2.6: a small TFP drop is observed in the construction sector while a big TFP drop
is observed in the construction sector. The “within” part is strikingly different in the two
subfigures; while it is slightly positive in the manufacturing sector, it accounts for almost
one-third of the TFP drop in the construction sector. The “between” term is small in both
sectors. This stark contrast between the two sectors implies that at least in the subsample
of stayers, the misallocation cannot be the dominant channel.
It is also observed that the “entry” bar is as important as the “total” bar. This means
that the group of newly entering firms has a measured TFP that is much lower than the
weighted average of the reference year. However, this bar contains both the misallocation
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channel and the mismeasurement channel. Therefore, we need a model to tear apart these
two channels within the “entry” group.
2.4 Evidence of Labor Quality from Worker-Firm
Matched Data
In this section, I present two results using worker-firm matched data from the Structure
of Earnings Survey (SES) of Eurostat: first, the labor quality control with only limited
observable characteristics fails to capture a big share of the wage variation; second, the
labor quality deteriorates in expanding sectors but not in non-expanding sectors.
The SES data are obtained by a two-stage random sampling approach of enterprises or
local units (first-stage) and employees (second stage). The frequency of the survey is every
four years. The data used in this paper are from the surveys of 2002 and 2006.
There are a few technical complications. First, although the anonymization procedure
used to protect the privacy of firms and workers might change the precision of the survey,
the statistics of the data shows that such modification has a statistically insignificant effect
on the information of the survey. The natural step of anonymization is to replace names of
firms and workers by codes which are not identifiable. This step does not change the real
content of the survey. However, even after this step, firms andworkers are still subject to the
risk of ”spontaneous identification” due to the information revealed by their characteristics.
So a further anonymization procedure is to make the characteristics of firms or workers a
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bit vaguer if there exists such a risk. For example, if in a certain area there is only one firm
that employs more than 250 employees, then the size of that firm may be modified to more
than 49 employees. Such changes only affect a very small group of observations.
Another technical complication is the consistency of the survey across years. The 2002
survey of Spain does not include local units of enterprises with fewer than 10 employees,
but the 2006 survey does include those small local units. Therefore, to make the data com-
parable across years, I delete the workers working in the local units with fewer than 10
employees. This may cause an upward bias of the labor quality change in the expanding
sector, and I will discuss it in the subsection 2.4.
Third, the randomization in selecting firms and workers and the anonymization proce-
dure render the SES data to be cross-sectional for each survey. Alternatively speaking, the
SES data has no panel feature, which leaves it inappropriate to run the two-way fixed-effect
model as in Abowd and Kramarz 1999 and Card et al. 2016. However, I can still back out
the distribution of the unobserved labor quality by running the regression of wage on firm
fixed effect and observed labor quality. The potential assortative matching between firms
and workers will result in a less dispersed residual wage compared to the dispersion of the
unobserved labor quality. I will discuss in subsection 2.4 that this actually underestimates
the importance of the unobserved labor quality. 9
9Abowd and Kramarz 1999 and other following papers such as Card et al. 2016 usually show that there
is very little correlation between the worker fixed effect and the firm fixed effect.
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Insufficiency of the KLEMS’ Control of Labor Quality
In this subsection, I argue that the labor quality control in the KLEMS dataset is limited
and not sufficient to capture a big portion of the wage variation.
The evidence to support this argument comes from examining how much wage varia-
tion can be explained by the observed labor quality characteristics in the KLEMS dataset.
More specifically, I investigate the R-square statistics of the regression of log wage on the
observed labor quality characteristics in the KLEMS dataset. According to O’Mahony and
Timmer 2009, the KLEMS dataset cross-classifies the labor force by gender, educational
attainment and age into 18 categories (respectively, 2 3 3 types). The SES worker-firm
matched data have more detailed categorization of educational attainment and age (respec-
tively, 6 types).
More specifically, I run the following regression for each year on the sectoral level and
for the entire economy.
ln(wjst) = 0st + genderjst + educationjst + agejst + "jst; (2.7)
where wjst is the deflated wage bill of worker j in sector s at time t. The coefficients
of the regression are omitted for the sake of simplicity.
Workers can be divided into two categories by gender, six by education, and six by age.
The result of the regression run in equation 2.7 is shown in Table 2.4. In the whole
economy and in the manufacturing sector, about one-third of the wage variation can be
explained by the observed labor quality characteristics used in KLEMS. In the construction
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sector, however, the same characteristics only account for about 20 percent of the wage
variation.
The R-square statistics reveal two messages. First, generally speaking a majority of
wage variation cannot be explained by the variation of the relatively easily observed labor
characteristics such as gender, education attainment and age. Second, this unexplained
wage variation problem is much worse in the construction sector. In order to capture the
labor quality more precisely, more variables are needed.
Observed Labor Quality beyond KLEMS
In this subsection, I present evidence that labor quality deteriorates in expanding sectors
compared to stable sectors beyond the dimensions controlled by KLEMS, (i.e., gender, age
and education). One important dimension of workers’ quality is the tenure, which depicts
the length of the service in enterprise. The worker-firm matched data shows a significant
difference of tenure length change between the construction sector and the manufacturing
sector, both in average terms and for firm managers.
The average tenure in the construction sector has decreased by 2.5 percent, while that of
the manufacturing sector has increased by 2.5 percent. One possible scenario is that people
with low experience moved into the expanding construction sector, while no such labor
movement into the non-expanding manufacturing sector.
A 5 percent difference in tenure growth might not seem large, but we have to take into
account the following issues. First, it is just the growth difference from 2002 to 2006.
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Table 2.4: Regression of ln(wage) on Observed Individual Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2002
All Sectors Manufac. Construc.
2006
All Sectors Manufac. Construc.
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Gender F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Gender M 0.243 0.270 0.199 0.222 0.263 0.173
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
educ 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
educ 2 0.058 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.026 0.015
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
educ 3 0.274 0.258 0.163 0.221 0.214 0.143
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
educ 4 0.356 0.335 0.176 0.281 0.286 0.160
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
educ 5 0.666 0.658 0.556 0.599 0.561 0.482
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
educ 6 0.775 1.000 0.650 0.716 0.285
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.17)
age 14-19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
age 20-29 0.123 0.159 0.108 0.096 0.164 0.076
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
age 30-39 0.319 0.322 0.218 0.250 0.298 0.159
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
age 40-49 0.478 0.494 0.293 0.382 0.431 0.221
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
age 50-59 0.573 0.636 0.363 0.480 0.557 0.293
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
age 60+ 0.531 0.613 0.380 0.501 0.578 0.367
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.270 1.271 1.392 1.387 1.350 1.514
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Adj.R-sqr 0.344 0.365 0.198 0.328 0.334 0.198
Obs 216400 83808 15548 219723 77381 16641
Raw data from Structure of Earnings Survey - Eurostat
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Under a simplistic assumption that the growth rate is constant from 1999 to 2007, there
would be a 10 percent difference in tenure growth between two sectors. Second, deletion
of the local units with fewer than 10 employees may contribute to the underestimation of
the difference of the growth rate of the tenure. The exclusion of of those small firms also
excluds newly incoming labor. Since the expanding sectors have more such small firms
and probably more unexperienced incoming workers, the difference in the growth rate of
tenure could potentially be bigger.
The tenure of certain important occupations, such as managers, is arguably more im-
portant than just the average tenure, as it may reflect how much they know about managing
the firm. The average tenure of the firm managers10 in the construction sector has dropped
from 8.94 years to 6.42 years from 2002 to 2006, which is a 28 percent decrease. However,
the average tenure of the firm managers in the manufacturing sector has increased from
11.69 to 14.11 years during the same period of time, which is a 21 percent increase.
One concern of the evidence drawn from tenure length would be the age variation has
almost captured all the tenure variation. However, the correlation between the age groups
and the tenure groups shows that the age group variation does not capture all the variation
in tenure group variation. Using the tenure group definition in the first column in Table 2.5,
the SES data show that correlation between age and tenure is only 0.52 in all sectors, 0.32
in the construction sector and 0.61 in the manufacturing sector. This correlation is not due
to the ad hoc definition of the tenure group. Using a different tenure group definition shown
10In the occupation classification, the firm managers are coded as 12 “corporate managers” and 13 “man-
agers of small enterprises.”
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in the second column of Table 2.5, the correlation between age group and tenure group is
0.53 in all sectors, 0.34 in the construction sector and 0.62 in the manufacturing sector.
If we consider yet another definition of tenure group as in column 3 of 2.5, the correlation
between age group and tenure group is 0.53 in all sectors, 0.34 in the construction sector and
0.61 in the manufacturing sector. The message is that although there is positive correlation
between tenure and age, the correlation is not 1. It means the tenure variable does contain
information that the age variable does not.
Table 2.5: Tenure Group and Age Group
Tenure Group 1 Tenure Group 2 Tenure Group 2 Age Group
< 10 < 5 < 3 < 20
[10; 20) [5; 15) [3; 13) [20; 30)
[20; 30) [15; 25) [13; 23) [30; 40)
[30; 40) [25; 35) [23; 33) [40; 50)
[40; 50) [35; 45) [33; 43) [50; 60)
 50  45  43  60
The age group is from the SES-Eurostat data
Tenure group 1, tenure group 2 and tenure group 3 are by the author’s def-
inition.
Unobserved Labor Quality
In this subsection, I show how I back out the distribution of the unobserved labor quality
using worker-firm matched data. Although the worker-firm matched data have more in-
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formation than KLEMS to characterize labor quality such as tenure length, it is impossible
to exhaust all the labor characteristics that are related to labor quality. Other labor quality
dimensions, such as diligence, communication skills, etc., are hard to measure by the data.
To back out the total unobserved labor quality, I assume that the wage variation has
three sources: the firm characteristics, the observed labor characteristics used by KLEMS
and other dimensions of labor quality beyond KLEMS. The idea is that after running the
regression of the wage on gender, education, age and firm fixed effect, the residual wage
variation can be attributed to other dimensions of labor quality beyond KLEMS.
The specification of the regression is shown in equation 2.8.
ln(wjst) = i(j)st + genderjst + educationjst + agejst + "jst; (2.8)
where wjst is the deflated wage bill of worker j in sector s at time t, i(j) indicates the
firm’s identifier where worker j works; andi(j)st is the firm fixed effect.11 The coefficients
of the regression are omitted for the sake of simplicity.
The result of the regression is shown in Table 2.6. Compared to the result of the regres-
sion without firm fixed effect in Table 2.4, the adjusted R-square has increased from 20-40
percent to 60-70 percent.
The unexplained wage variation in equation 2.8 can be interpreted as the unobserved
labor quality, but I have to deal with the following concerns. First, there is potential assor-
tative matching between firms and workers. While assortative matching itself is an open
11Firm fixed effect can be identified since there are more than one workers in each firm. On average, there
are 8.6 observations in each firm.
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question,12 this problem only makes firm fixed effects capture some labor characteristics.
Alternatively speaking, the unobserved labor characteristics should probably capture wage
variation larger than just 30 - 40 percent. Second, some labor search models predict that
even without labor heterogeneity there should be wage variation because of the search fric-
tion, such as Mortensen 2005. But even that strand of literature does not exclude labor
quality to explain the wage dispersion. Moreover, Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante 2011
shows that frictional wage dispersion can only explains a small part of the wage variation
using quantitative model.
The distribution of the residual wage distribution can then be used in the calibration of
the model.
12Abowd and Kramarz 1999 and Card et al. 2016 find there is very limited assortative matching, while
Borovicková and Shimer 2017 argues significant assortative matching.
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Table 2.6: Regression of ln(wage) on Observed Individual Characteristics and Firm Fixed
Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2002
All Sectors Manufac. Construc.
2006
All Sectors Manufac. Construc.
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Gender F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Gender M 0.182 0.186 0.197 0.170 0.190 0.186
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
age 14-19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
age 20-29 0.070 0.071 0.068 0.063 0.112 0.057
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
age 30-39 0.221 0.207 0.156 0.184 0.218 0.144
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
age 40-49 0.333 0.332 0.212 0.278 0.337 0.183
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
age 50-59 0.383 0.400 0.263 0.331 0.401 0.234
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
age 60+ 0.391 0.435 0.276 0.369 0.431 0.296
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
educ 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
educ 2 0.045 0.042 0.055 0.033 0.044 0.062
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
educ 3 0.136 0.148 0.112 0.107 0.131 0.115
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
educ 4 0.174 0.181 0.107 0.134 0.163 0.136
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
educ 5 0.435 0.472 0.402 0.368 0.409 0.333
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
educ 6 0.600 0.664 0.501 0.554 0.034
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.23)
Constant 1.510 1.531 1.474 1.587 1.543 1.536
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Adj.R-sqr 0.687 0.714 0.639 0.629 0.626 0.593
Obs 216400 83808 15548 219723 77381 16641
Raw data from Structure of Earnings Survey - Eurostat
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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First row: full sample; second row: half sample; third row: subsample with stayers
TFP is the De Loecker estimator.
The mean is normalized such that in the year 1999, unweighted mean of lnTFP is zero.
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Figure 2.10: Decomposition











st The full definition of the
decomposition is in equation 2.6.
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2.5 Model
This is an infinite horizon model that features both the misallocation and the mismeasure-
ment channels. With the key distributions calibrated to micro data, the model predicts a
much milder true TFP drop compared to the measured one.
The misallocation channel is built on Reis 2013, and the mismeasurement channel is
built on Young 2014. The model has four types of agents: a household with heterogeneous
workers, a tradable sector with a representative firm, a non-tradable sector with heteroge-
neous entrepreneurs, and a representative bank.
The mechanism of the model is as follows: a negative interest rate shock (Eurozone
integration) enables the low-productivity firms in the expanding sector (the non-tradable
sector) to enter the production by borrowing. This brings down the average productivity of
this sector. Moreover, the borrowing cost for existing non-tradable firms is also lowered and
allows them to borrow more; thus, the sector expands. The tradable sector is not affected
by the shock since it is assumed that the tradable firms are far less financially constrained.
Therefore, there is no expansion in this sector. The expansion in the non-tradable sector
increases base wage and attracts the labor from the tradable sector. The marginal worker
entering the non-tradable sector is less efficient compared to the average existing workers,
while the way the TFP is calculated treats new workers the same as the existing ones. The
lower efficiency of the worker is translated to the lower imputed TFP. The existence of the




The household is one big decision maker for consumption choice. Although there are dif-
ferent types of workers in the household, the household only cares about the income on
the aggregate level and maximizes the aggregate utility. This technique has been used in
Gertler, Kiyotaki, et al. 2010. This assumption implies that there is perfect consumption
insurance within the household.
The source of the income for the household is the labor income in both sectors. To
make the model more tractable and intuitive, I assume the household in the economy is
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1  + (1  )(pNt )1 ]
1
1  ,
wTt and wNt are respectively the base wage of each sector.
Conceptually, it is not difficult to give the household access to the bond market.
The efficiency labor LTt and LNt are different from the numbers of workers employed,
but take into the consideration of the labor productivity.
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Each individual within the household is otherwise identical except for the productiv-
ity in each sector. The productivity in tradable sector is zT , and that of the non-tradable
sector is zN , and the pair of the productivity (zT ; zN) is drawn from some joint cumula-
tive distribution G(zT ; zN) independently. A worker provides 1 unit of inelastic labor, so
his/her efficiency labor is zT in the tradable sector and zN in the non-tradable sector. A
worker chooses to enter the tradable sector if he/she can earn higher income there, that
is, wNt zN < wTt zT ; or alternatively zN < zT/!t, where !t =
wNt
wTt
. If zT  zN!t, the
household chooses to enter the non-tradable sector.
Firms
In the model, the tradable sector and the non-tradable sector are modeled very differently
in terms of financial constraints. The non-tradable sector has both a collateral constraint
and a working capital constraint. This modeling technique is abstracted from the fact that
the non-tradable firms are on average smaller than the tradable firms, and thus they are
more financially constrained. Using the US firm-level data, Chodorow-Reich 2014 shows
that the employment of smaller firms is more affected by the negative credit supply shock
to their banks. This is because the sticky bank-borrower relationships make it harder for
smaller firms to switch from affected banks to good banks. Moreover, the small firms
lack other sorts of financing rather than borrowing from banks. The paper also claims that
the findings of “Small vs Big” are consistent with the existing literature, such as Duygan-
Bump, Levkov, andMontoriol-Garriga 2015, explaining this by lower level of transparency
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within smaller firms. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, andMaksimovic 2005 employs unique, cross-
country firm-level survey data to prove that being small in size is correlated to facing more
financial obstacles. Some may suspect the correlation between size and financial constraint
is only sensible within a sector. However, the result of both papers are across sectors.
Tradable Sector
There is one representative firm in the tradable sector. The firm borrows at the foreign inter-
est rate, and hires the efficiency labor in the labor market. It is assumed that the technology
and the capital stock are active in the next period.
The production function is Cobb-Douglas:







where Y Tt is the real output of the tradable sector of the current period, and it is produced
with the technology and capital stock of the previous period,ATt 1 andKTt 1, as well as with
the labor employment of the current period, LTt .
The factors market are assumed to be competitive.







1 T = 1 + rft (2.11)
(1  T )ATt 1(KTt 1)T (LTt ) T = wTt (2.12)
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From equation 2.11 we can see that the interest rate at which the tradable firm borrows
is rf , which is the foreign interest rate.
Equations 2.11 and 2.12 pin down the base wage of the tradable sector:










Here, we can see that there is a one-to-one map from the true TFP of the tradable sector
to the wage, so we will not consider the mismeasurement in the tradable sector.
Non-tradable Sector
The non-tradable sector has a distribution of entrepreneurs with the CDF of TFPH(a), and
a 2 [a; a]. The entrepreneurs maximize their lifetime discounted utility. By achieving this
goal, the entrepreneurs first solve a static profit maximization problem and then a dynamic
optimal wealth allocation problem. In other words, in period t an entrepreneur has to decide
first whether to enter the production process and then how much to spend on consumption.
It is also assumed that the technology and the capital stock are active in the next period
as in the tradable sector. The static profit maximization problem can be solved using back-
wards induction. The entrepreneur has to choose how much to invest in the capital stock
if she enters the production process. If she opts to stay out of the production, she puts the
wealth less consumption in the domestic bank.
We will see in the following paragraphs that once the entrepreneur decides to enter the
production process, she will invest all her wealth into the capital stock. Moreover, she faces
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a borrowing constraint: the debt she has to pay back in the next period has to be smaller
than a fraction of the potential output less the wage bill. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs
face a working capital constraint.13 The idea of working capital constraint is that the firm
must hold  units of a non-interest-bearing asset (cash) for each unit of wage payments.
This constraint increases the marginal cost of labor hiring for the firm by wN r1+r .
Let us first solve the problem of the entrepreneur decides to enter the production process






t   ~wNt lt   bt
bt  (pNt at 1kNt 1l1 Nt   ~wNt lt)
kt 1 = v^t 1 + bt1+rbt
(2.14)




and v^t 1 is the wealth of the period t  1 that has not been consumed, which is defined as
v^t 1 = vt 1 pt 1ct 1 The capital stock used in the production is the sum of her own wealth
and the borrowed money. The reason why the borrowed money is discounted by 1 + rbt is
that the borrowing happens at the beginning of the period and the repayment happens at the
end of the same period.
13This working capital constraint is a model technique widely used in the international macroeconomics
field, such as Neumeyer and Perri 2005, Uribe andYue 2006, CHANG and FERNÁNDEZ 2013 andUribe and
Schmitt-Grohé 2017. The main reason to introduce the working capital constraint is to provide a supply-side
channel through which the interest rate shock matters more.
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The reason to add the working-capital constraint is because the increase of foreign bor-
rowing  in the model is a supply shock: the lower borrowing cost induces the non-tradable
firms to borrow more, employ more and produce more. However, more non-tradable goods
push down the price, which reduces the profitability of the non-tradable sector, and hence
decreases the employment. Therefore, these two forces counteract one another. The intro-
duction of the working-capital constraint will make the increase in  another positive supply
shock, thus increasing the employment in the non-tradable sector. This force will drive up
the base wage ratio between the non-tradable sector and the tradable sector, attracting labor
flow into the non-tradable sector. The quantitative effect of the working-capital constraint
is very low though.





Using equation 2.15 to replace lt in problem 2.14, the problem can be written as:
Nt = maxfkt 1g
xt(at 1)kt 1   (1 + rbt )(kt 1   v^t 1)
(1 + rbt )(kt 1   v^t 1)  xt(at 1)kt 1
where xt(at 1) is the return on capital k 1, and is defined as follows:








Since now the profit maximization problem becomes a linear problem in kt 1, the result
depends on the sign of the coefficient of kt 1: xt(at 1)  (1 + rbt ).
Here we use a ”guess-and-verify” strategy to solve for the problem. Since here we
already assume that the entrepreneur enters the production in period t, it means kt 1 > 0.
Thus, we do not have to consider the equilibrium where xt(at 1) < (1 + rbt ).

















The entrepreneurs compare the return on wealth and the deposit rate to determine
whether she wants to enter the production, so there is a cutoff productivity a under which







= 1 + rdt (2.18)
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where rdt is the domestic deposit rate.
In the bank’s problem, we will see that rdt > rbt . Moreover xt(at 1) is an increasing
function on at 1. Thus, for all the producing entrepreneurs, we have Rt(at) > 1 + rdt >
1+rbt . From this inequality, we know that once in the production function, xt(at 1) > 1+rbt .
Then our initial guess is verified.











The gross revenue of the non-tradable firm is
pNt y
N









After solving the static profit maximizing problem, we can solve for the dynamic prob-
lem of the entrepreneurs.
Let I(at > at ) be the indicator of producing. at is determined by equation 2.18. Since
Rt(at 1) is an increasing function, an entrepreneur produces if she has a TFP higher than
the the cutoff TFP, or she puts her wealth in the domestic bank as deposit.
Thus, the dynamic of the individual wealth is vt+1 = [I(at 1 > at 1)Rt(at 1) + (1  
I(at 1 > at 1))(1 + r
d
t )](vt   ptct).
And the entrepreneur has to solve the following dynamic problem:
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maxct E t ln(ct)
s.t. vt+1 = [I(at 1 > at 1)Rt(at 1) + (1  I(at 1 > at 1))(1 + rt)](vt   ptct)
The solution for this problem is that
ct = (1  ) vtpt
vt+1 = [I(at 1 > at 1)Rt(at 1) + (1  I(at 1 > at 1))(1 + rt)]vt
(2.20)
A entrepreneur’s consumption is always a constant fraction of her wealth.
Bank
The bank maximizes its profit subjects to a budget constraint:








where Bt is the face value (FV) of the loan to the non-tradable sector, Ft is the FV of
the borrowing from the foreign countries, and Dt is the FV of the deposit from the non-
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tradable sector. , which controls how much foreign borrowing the bank can get, is the
most important parameter of the model. Also, we assume here that the bank has no equity
and it finances all its loans by borrowing from abroad and deposits.
In the equilibrium, we will consider the case rft < rdt , so the bank would borrow from
abroad to the maximum: Ft = Bt. Moreover, because of the linear technology of the
bank, it has to attain zero profits in the equilibrium, so Bt = Ft +Dt.
Hence, in the equilibrium, the deposit has to be a constant fraction of the total lending:
Dt = (1  )Bt (2.21)










since  2 [0; 1], rft  rbt  rdt .
Market Clearing Conditions
Non-tradable Goods
The demand for the non-tradable goods has to be equal to the supply.
First, let us pin down the demand for the non-tradable goods CNt , which comes from
two sources – the demand from non-tradable sector entrepreneurs and that from the house-
hold. The consumption aggregator is a constant elasticity substitution (CES) aggregator
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of tradable and non-tradable goods, that is the total consumption Ct = [(CTt )
1  1





 1 , where  2 (0; 1), and  is the elasticity of substitution between tradable
goods and non-tradable goods.












1  + (1  )(pNt )1 ]
1
1  ;





The derivation of the price index and the demand of non-tradable good can be found in
Appendix 3.7.
Using the fact of the equilibrium condition that the demand for total consumption comes
from two sources: the consumption of the entrepreneurs and consumption of the household,
so Ct = CHt +
R
ctdG(t).










































where Vt is the aggregate wealth of entrepreneurs, defined as Vt =
R
vddH(at 1)

































Loan and Deposit Market Clearing
By integration of the debt of producing entrepreneurs, we can get the aggregate loan. And
by integration of the deposit of non-producing entrepreneurs, we get the aggregate deposit.
Then we can link them using equation 2.21 and get the following equation:












(1 + rdt )(1  )H(at 1)
(1  ) (2.26)
The details of the derivation can be found in Appendix 3.7.
Non-tradable Sector Labor Market Clearing
By equating labor supply and labor demand in the non-tradable sector, with the law of
motion of aggregate wealth of entrepreneurs in the Non-tradable sector, we can get the
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zN jzN)dzN = 1  N
(1  )N ~wNt
Vt (2.27)
The details of the derivation of the law of motion of the aggregate wealth of en-
trepreneurs and the labor market clearing condition of the non-tradable sector can be found
in Appendix 3.7. All the equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix 3.7.
The Mismeasurement of TFP
Suppose the non-tradable sector has a Cobb-Douglas production function:







LN here is the efficiency labor in the non-tradable sector, and it can be expressed as
LN = qN zN , where qN is the share of labor that works in the non-tradable sector.




















Wemeasure TFP in macroeconomics as the Solow residual, so the true TFP growth rate
is
A^N(true) = Y^ N   NK^N   (1  N)(q^N + ^zN) (2.28)
However, for a macro-econometrician, the labor efficiency change is unobservable;
therefore, when calculating the Solow residual, what is actually estimated is following:
A^N(est) = Y^ N   NK^N   (1  N)q^N = A^N(true) + (1  N)^zN (2.29)








Now, the estimated TFP in equation 2.31 can be transformed to:
A^N(est) = A^N(true) + (1  N)q^N (2.31)
As long as this elasticity  is not zero, there will be mis-measurement.
It is easy to see that  >  1. In the definition of zN , if the increase of qN does not
change LN ,  would be  1, but the amount of efficiency labor LN also increases when
there are more people enter the sector. Therefore  should be bigger than  1.
The interesting point is to determine the sign of the elasticity. If  < 0, then when the
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sector expands, the average sectoral labor efficiency decreases, which leads to an underes-
timation of sectoral TFP.
According to Young 2014, we can have the following theorem:
Theorem: If the following two conditions are satisfied:
1.the distributions of zT and zN are independent: G(zT ; zN) = GT (zT )GN(zN);
2.gx(zx)zx
Gx(zx)
( where x = T;N ) are decreasing functions,
then   0.
The first condition is basically saying that if a person is born to be a good chef, he/she
may or may not be an efficient engineer, or a good micro theory professor may struggle in
the field of macro economics. The second condition is more like a technical requirement,
and all widely used distributions satisfy this property. The proof of the theorem can be
found in Appendix 3.7.
Let’s see how it works out in an analytical example.
Besides the assumption that zT and zN are independent, let us assume furthermore that
cdfs GT and GN are exponentially distributed over [0;1]; that is, GT (zT ) = 1   e T zT ,
and GN(zN) = 1   e NzN . Accordingly, pdfs are gT (zT ) = T e T zT and gN(zN) =
Ne
 NzN .
With the assumption on the distribution of the labor quality in the two sectors, we can























The sum of the quantity of labor in two sectors equal to the total quantity of labor which
is normalized to 1, that is, qT + qN = 1.





















Then it is easy to see that when the wage ratio ! increases, the labor moves out from
the tradable sector into the non-tradable sector, and the average labor quality of the tradable
sector increases while that of the non-tradable sector decreases.
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2.6 Numerical Result
In this section, I present a calibrated version of the model and show that the prediction of
this calibrated model matches the data. It also shows that the mismeasreument channel
contributes much more than the misallocation channel to the TFP drop in the model.
Calibration and Impulse Response Functions
Following Reis 2013, one period of the model is set to be four years to justify the absence
of nominal rigidities and the assumption of the i.i.d firm-level productivity shock. The risk-
free rate rf is set to be 0.08 and  = 0:84 is picked in order to make sure that the average
steady-state capital return is around 0:16.
According to Table 2.3, setting N = 0:3 and T = 0:3 is a good approximation and
close to the convention of the calibration of the Cobb-Douglas production function.
The productivity level of the tradable sector AT is set to be the average productivity of
the non-tradable sector: AT = exp(0) = 1.
The coefficient  measures the percentage of the finance that comes from the bank. The
BIS data shows that the credit from the bank to a non-financial corporation should be around
0:3. Since it is even more difficult for the non-tradable firms to borrow from the banks, I
set  = 0:2.
The elasticity of substitution  = 2 is a very conventional number. The coefficient that
governs the share of the non-tradable consumption  = 0:5, which is also a conventional
number.
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The distribution of the productivity of the non-tradable firms is log-normal, which
matches the full sample TFP distribution of the construction sector of Spain.
The working capital constraint parameter  is set to be 0:5. According to Uribe and
Schmitt-Grohé 2017, this parameters means that the firm needs to hold half of the wage
bill in advance, which means two years of wage bill in this model. However, to modify the
parameter to a smaller number does not affect the prediction of the model.
The distribution of labor quality in the tradable sector and non-tradable sector matches
the distribution of the non-observable individual characteristics from the analysis of the
SES of Eurostat for Spain.
The overview of the calibration is listed in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Calibration
Parameters  rf N T AT    
0.84 0.08 0.3 0.3 1 0.5 0.2 2 0.5
Distribution of a Lower Bound (a1) Upper Bound (a2)  
Log-normal exp(-8) exp(4) 0 0.45
Distribution of zN Lower Bound (zN1 ) Upper Bound (zN2 )  
Log-normal exp(-8) exp(3) -3 1.98
Distribution of zT Lower Bound (zT1 ) Upper Bound (zT1 )  
Log-normal exp(-7) exp(5) -2.2 1.2
Figure 2.11 shows the impulse responses of the key variables in the model to explain
the TFP drop in the non-tradable sector, and thus the entire economy. The shock here is that
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 rises from 0 to 0.6 in the first period. The model jumps from one steady state to the new
steady state very quickly and stays there. According to equation 2.18, the lowered deposit
rate will induce a lower cutoff productivity a, at which an entrepreneur enters the market
and produces. The lowered cutoff a triggers the average productivity to drop, but only to
a limited amount. That is the black solid line in the “AN” graph of Figure 2.11.
The shock also changes the borrowing cost of the firms in the non-tradable sector to
a much lower level, which can be seen from equation 2.22. This leads to an expansion
of the non-tradable sector. Therefore, the wage ratio between the non-tradable sector and
tradable sector ! = wN
wT
increases. The relative increase of wage in the non-tradable sector
attracts people to move into this sector, which explains the increase of the number of people
in graph “qN”, and also the total efficiency labor increase in graph “LN .” However, the
average quality of the non-tradable sector, as in graph “ZN ,” decreases due to the Theorem
in subsection 2.5. The lowered average quality explains the measured TFP drop, as shown
by the red dashed line in graph “AN”.
Therefore, the key graph in Figure 2.11 is graph “AN .” The most important message
from this graph is that the measured TFP drop is much worse than the one without any
mismeasurement of the labor quality. Alternatively speaking, this means that if we can
measure the labor quality correctly and take it into the consideration in TFP estimation, then
corrected TFP drop will be much more mild compared to the TFP data we see now. This
prediction of the TFP drop is in line with the TFP decomposition that I perform in Figure
2.10, showing that the mismeasurement channel dominates the misallocation channel in
explaining the TFP drop of the non-tradable sector.
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Figure 2.11: Impulse Responses/Trasitional Paths
The calibration of the model is listed in Table 2.7.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has documented differentiated TFP growth paths between expanding sectors and
non-expanding sectors for southern European countries between 1996 and 2007. Careful
analysis of aggregate data and micro-level data shows that capital misallocation cannot
explain this phenomenon, but labor quality mismeasurement can. If labor quality is treated
properly, the true TFP drop of the expanding sector would be much smaller. Therefore,
the true TFP drop of the total economy would be smaller as well. One policy implication
we draw from this paper is that we should review the policy targeting the misallocation
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problem. Also this paper calls for a revision of TFP calculation that incorporates more
labor quality than the state-of-the-art research such as KLEMS does.
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Chapter 3
State Reform and China’s Productivity Deceleration:
Firm-level Evidence1
3.1 Introduction
The end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century brought extraordinarily high
growth in China. This has been attributed to rapid capital accumulation, improvements in
technology adoption, and remarkable changes in the organization of production between
state and private agents. The drivers of the recent Chinese deceleration, however, are still
unclear. Using a combination of firm- and sector-level evidence, we study the drivers of this
deceleration. We argue that past growth gains from state-ownership reform have lost steam
recently, contributing to a perceived deceleration and even decline inmeasured TFP growth.
Furthermore, we find that deceleration in measured TFP within firms is not necessarily
driven by worsening technologies, but from past investments resulting in over-capacity
problems.
This paper has three main contributions. First, we document TFP dynamics in Chinese
1This chapter is co-authored with Jorge Alvarez and Grace Li. Part of the chapter was written when Tuo
Chen was doing summer internship in the IMF.
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manufacturing at both the sectoral and firm level using several techniques from the litera-
ture. These include Cobb-Douglas specifications with and without constant return to scale,
as well as instrumental variable techniques proposed by Olley-Pakes (1996), Levinsohn-
Petrin (2003) and De-Locker (2011). We compute firm-level TFP measures using data
from the Chinese Industrial surveys, and compare trends and dynamics to aggregate TFP
computed from sector-level data from China’s Industrial Statistical Yearbook. All proce-
dures, using both firm and sector level data, reflect the same patterns for TFP growth. They
show impressive growth in the early 2000s which decelerated after 2007 and turned flat or
slightly negative after 2011.
Second, we decompose past TFP gains and deceleration between firms and state-
ownership status using a novel statistical decomposition technique. The exercise decom-
poses TFP changes into a between SOE/Non-SOE component (driven by past privatization),
and within SOE/Non-SOE. Furthermore, within SOE/Non SOE components are further de-
composed into between-firm reallocation and within-firm TFP change components. This
statistical decompositions allows for an assessment of the quantitative importance of past
privatization efforts as well as the role of reallocation of capital labor and capital between
firms in both state-controlled and private production.
Third, we consider the role of capital underutilization in explaining the recent deceler-
ation. We do this by linking subsectors covered by the Chinese Industrial Survey to sub-
sector level production and capacity data fromChinese statistical year book. The data shows
an moderate improvement of capital utilization metrics in most sectors up to 2007, with a
sharp decline in the years where TFP is decelerated. An assessment of the quantitative
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importance of the capital utilization channel indicates that this can explained a significant
share of the Chinese deceleration.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and procedures
used in computing TFP at the firm and sector level. Section 3.3 documents the aggregate
trends of these measures. Section 3.4 documents gaps in TFP between SOE and non-SOEs
and their evolution over time. Section 3.5 conducts a statistical decomposition of aggregate
TFP changes between and within firms. Section 3.6 evaluates the role of capital utilization
in explaining TFP dynamics. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Empirical strategy
Data Description
We employ two main sources of data in this paper. Aggregate data is downloaded from
the China Industry Statistical Yearbook, including the sales income, sales cost, number of
people employed, and total assets. This is complemented with the aggregate wage bill from
China’s Labor Statistical Yearbook. The two-digit sectoral price data is downloaded from
the China Statistical Yearbook2.
Firm-level data is from Chinese Industrial Survey (1998 - 2013). This dataset has been
widely used in the literature, including the seminal work on capital by Chang-Tai Hsieh
2009. The main difference of our dataset compared to previous ones is that the it covers a
2The China Statistical Yearbook data can be accessed through the website of National Bureau of Statistics
of China, while the China Industry Statistical Yearbook and the China Labor Statistical Yearbook can be
accessed through the website of China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (http://www.cnki.net/).
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longer time span. While the literature has focused on the period between 1998 and 2007,
we expand this to include years up to 2014.
In doing this, there are several gaps in the data which we attempt to circumvent. The
commonly used sample of the Chinese Industrial Survey covering 1998 - 2007, is relatively
homogeneous: each year has almost identical variables and a unique identifier. In contrast,
the data after 2007 presents several shortcomings. First, the 2008 year data has no firm-
level identifier and 2009 misses one-third of the identifiers. This complication make it is
impossible to include 2008 and 2009 data in the panel dataset. Because of this, we prepare
two versions of data set. One version includes 2008 and 2009 data which we treat as cross-
sectional dataset for the calculation of the yearly cross-sectional aggregate statistics. The
other version excludes the data of these two years and is a panel dataset at the firm-level.
Second, some variables needed for the proper calculation of firm-level TFP are missing
in the later years. In particular, the key variable of value added, which serves as output
in the production function, is missing after year 2007. To address this, we calculated our
ownmeasure of total factor productivity that does not subtract intermediate inputs from total
production. We validate this approach by comparing our measure to the traditional measure
of TFP using the pre-2007 data. We will show in the next subsection that the shortcoming
does not have great effects on measured TFP growth in the 1998-2007 period. Finally, the




In this section, we describe the different methodologies used to measure TFP at both the
aggregate and the firm level.
We start with the estimation method using aggregate data. This assumes a Cobb-
Douglas production function and constant returns to scale. We use value added as a measure
of output; therefore, the production function has two inputs: capital and labor. The weight
parameter is determined by the labor share, which is calculated as the total wage bill over
the value added. TFP in this approach is simply calculated as a Solow residual. The whole
procedure can be summarized by the following set of equations:
VAt = Sales Incomet   Sales Costt

















where V At stands for the valued added, and Real V At is V At deflated by the producer
price index Pt, capital measure Kt is equivalent to assets deflated by the price index of
investment in fixed assets PKt , wtLt is the total wage bill, Lt and Kt are respectively the
labor share and capital share. Variables “Sales Income”, “Sales Cost”, P , PK , Lt, wtLt and
“Total Asset” are all directly observed.
The analogous Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale approach is also applied to the
firm-level data as well, with some modifications. The value added, assets, labor and wage
bill are now all calculated at the firm level. Ideally, the producer price index and investment
price index would be observed at firm-level as well, but firm-level prices are not available
in our data set. We instead use use the two-digit sectoral producer price index and the same
industrial level investment price index as in the aggregate approach. The labor share and
capital share here aremeasured at the two-digit sectoral level. The estimation is summarized
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by the following equations:



















where vaist stands for the valued added of firm i in the two-digit sector at time t, andReal
vaist is vaist deflated by the two -digit sectoral producer price index Pst, capital measure





wistList is the total wage bill of the firms within two-digit sector s, Lst and Kst
are respectively the labor share and capital share in sector s. Variables vais, Ps, PK , Lis,
wisLis and Total Assetis are all directly observed.
In addition, we compute firm-level TFP using three methodologies that exploit the panel
dimension of the dataset: Olley and Pakes 1996, Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 andDe Loecker
2011. Both Olley and Pakes 1996 and Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 try to reduce the bias
induced by the correlation between firm-level productivity and input choices. The bias
3When using total assets instead, results do not change significantly.
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comes from the possibility that a specific firm may have private information about its own
productivity and make input decisions accordingly. This correlation between inputs and
productivity makes the OLS estimates biased.
The key assumption made in Olley and Pakes 1996 is that the firm-level productivity
is a function of investment and this function is invertible. The paper also assumes a Cobb-
Douglas production function, but it no longer assumes constant returns to scale. More
specifically, the approach is designed to estimate the coefficients of the following equation
yist = 
llist + 
kkist + ssInds + ttyeart + 
SOESOEist + 
expexpist
+!ist(ageist; kist; invist) + "ist
(3.3)
where lower-case letters are the log values of the variables: yist = ln(Real V Aist), list =
lnList, kist = lnKist, and !ist is the residual TFP that is not captured by the observables.
age captures firm’s the length of existence. inv is the log value of firm’s investment. Indist
is the variable for two-digit sector. yearist captures the time fixed effect. SOEist is a
dummy indicate whether a firm is a state-owned enterprise. And expist is a dummy indicate
whether a firm exports or not.
The goal is to estimate l and k and back out the production function. Then the TFP
can be measured as the firm-level Solow residual. Since estimating equation 3.3 using
OLS produces biased estimated coefficients due to dependence of ! on k 4, a two-step
4There are ways to deal with the bias of l if ! is a function of l too. In the estimation we employ the
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where (ageist; kist; invist) = kkist + !(ageist; kist; invist). The functional form of
(ageist; kist; invist) is approximated by a higher-order polynomial of the input variables.
Moreover, we assume that !ist follows a Markov-chain process: !ist+1 = g(!ist) + ist+1,
and ist is iid. The second-step regression can be therefore expressed
bist+1 = kkist+1 + g(!(ageist; kist; invist)) + ist (3.5)
where the function g(!(:; :; :)) can also be approximated by a high-order polynomial.
The methodology in Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 is very similar to Olley and Pakes 1996.
But instead of using investment as the proxy for the unobserved productivity, intermediate
inputs are used. That is
yist = 
llist + 
kkist + ssInds + tyeart + 
SOESOEist + expexp
ist
+!ist(ageist; kist;mist) + "ist
(3.6)
methodology in Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2015 to correct for the estimate of l. But for the purpose of
illustration, we do not talk about it here.
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where miit is the measure of total operation inputs deflated by the intermediate input
price index.
For both Olley and Pakes 1996 and Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 approaches, estimated
firm-level productivity is given by
aist = yist   bkk   bll (3.7)
The final approach is that of De Loecker 2011. This addresses the implicit assumption
made by Olley and Pakes 1996 and Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 that the difference between
the firm-level price and two-digit sectoral level price is not correlated with the input choice.
This assumption could be broken, for example, when a monopolistic firm could charges
higher prices than the average sectoral price and enlarges its size (in terms of value added)
as a result. In this scenario, Pist Pst could be positively correlated with capital and labor.
The methodology in De Loecker 2011 take the potential bias caused by the price differ-
ence seriously and incorporate a CES demand system into the estimation. The regression
specification is as follows:
yist = 
llist + kkist + syst + ssInds + tyeart + SOESOEist
+expexpist + !ist(ageist; kist;mist) + "ist
(3.8)
where yst is the log value of the real term of two-digit sectoral value added, defined
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as yst  ln(i2svaist)   ln(Pst), and s is interpreted as the inverse of the elasticity of
substitution of sector s. TFP is therefore estimated as:
aist = (yist   bkk   bll   bsyst) 1
1 + bs (3.9)
3.3 TFP growth deceleration
This section shows the results from the TFP estimation procedures described above. First,
we show that all TFP measures from different methodologies are highly correlated and the
main conclusions are robust to different estimation procedures. Second, we show the trends
of TFP over the period, which show a TFP deceleration in the most recent years.
Table 3.1 and table 3.2 shows how closely the four measures of firm-level TFP growth
correlated with each other. “DL” stands for the methodology of TFP measure using De
Loecker 2011 described in equation 3.8 , “LP” for Levinsohn and Petrin 2003 in equa-
tion 3.6, “OP” for Olley and Pakes 1996 in equation 3.3 and “CD” for the Cobb-Douglas
methodology in equation 3.2. The reason for having two tables with high similarity is that
the variable value added is only observable between years 1999 and 2007. After year 2007,
we have to construct our own measure of value added. This approach is reflected in the
“Pseudo VA” measure used in table 3.2, which is calculated as the difference between the
firm-level “sales income” and “sales cost”. Because of the gaps in value added availability,
we present correlations of TFP estimates using value added from 1998 to 2007 in 3.1 and
TFP estimates using “Pseudo VA” from 1998 to 2013 in table 3.2. In both samples and both
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types of estimation approach, we find high correlation across all measures.
Table 3.1: DlnTFP Correlation measured by VA
Variables DL LP OP CD
DL 1.000
LP 0.998 1.000
OP 0.995 0.997 1.000
CD 0.942 0.945 0.966 1.000
Table 3.2: DlnTFP Correlation measured by Pseudo VA
Variables DL LP OP CD
DL 1.000
LP 0.997 1.000
OP 0.991 0.997 1.000
CD 0.969 0.977 0.982 1.000
Figure 3.1 shows the unweighted average TFP growth path measured by different
methodologies. The left panel uses the officially calculated value added while the right
panel uses the “Pseudo value added” calculated as the difference between “sales income”
and “sales cost”. The level difference by different measures of TFP is caused by the normal-
ization, therefore does not reveal any information. The informative pattern in this figure is
the trend. We observe that the growth path of TFP is very similar across different measures
in both sub-figures. This observation is consistent with the high correlation in table 3.1 and
table 3.2. The right panel tells us that starting around year 2011, the TFP growth rate starts
to decline, and it even becomes negative from year 2012 to year 2012.
Figure 3.2 plots the mean lnTFP paths by different weights using the firm-level TFP
measured by methodology in De Loecker 2011. Similarly, the left panel uses officially
calculated value added and the right panel uses the “pseudo value added”. The slowing
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(a) Directly Observed VA (b) Pseudo VA = Sales Income - Sales Cost
Figure 3.1: Unweighted Mean of lnTFP by different measures
down of TFP growth starting from year 2011 can be observed in any type of weighted mean
lnTFP on the right panel, be it the unweighted, value added weighted or labor weighted
mean lnTFP. Another interesting point of figure 3.2 is that the labor weighted mean is about
the same as the unweighted mean, while the value-added weighted mean is much higher in
both sub-figures. The reason for that is that the firms with higher TFP tend to have a higher
value added. However there is no clear correlation between the labor employment and TFP.
(a) Directly Observed VA (b) Pseudo VA = Sales Income - Sales Cost
Figure 3.2: Mean of lnTFP by different weights
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Figure 3.3 compares the firm-level TFP measure to the aggregate TFP measure, and
shows that both measures have the same trend. The red curve plots the unweighted mean
of value-added lnTFPmeasure, and the blue curve unweightedmean of pseudo-value-added
lnTFP measure using the methodology in Olley and Pakes 1996 with the firm-level data.
And we find that the two have the same trend between the period from year 1998 to 2007.
The green curve plots the aggregate lnTFP measure using equation 3.1. It can be seen that
after 2011, we observe the same reversal of TFP growth path that we observe in the firm-
level data. Moreover, the aggregate TFP series has a longer historical data, indicating that
after 2013, the TFP continues to drop.
Figure 3.3: Firm-level Estimation and Aggregate Estimation
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3.4 The Role of SOEs in TFP
In this section, we demonstrate that the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are different from
the non-state-owned-enterprises (Non-SOEs) in many aspects and how the timing the
growth and slowdown in privatization coincides with the timing of TFP growth and growth
and slowdown of manufacturing TFP. Moreover, we show evidence that the TFP decelera-
tion cannot be due to any sectoral difference since the growth pattern of TFP of almost all
sectors are the similar to that of the whole manufacturing sector.
Productivity of SOEs vs Non-SOEs
The empirical framework in this subsection is as follows:




it + "it (3.10)
where i is the firm identifier, t is the year subscript, g is the characteristic group sub-
script. Ng stands for the number of groups. Dgit is a dummy variable, defined asD
g
it = 0 if
i 62 g and Dgit = 1 if i 2 g.
When we divide firms into three categories: SOEs, collectvity-owned enterprises
(COEs)5 and non-SOEs, and run the regression in equation 3.10 year by year, we can plot
the graph in 3.4. Here we set the baseline group to be the group of non-SOE firms. That
is why in the left panel, there are only two series of coefficients standing for the SOEs
5COEs can be considered as one type of SOEs, which are owned by local governments. We will show
later that COE are less important in terms of size compared to the other two types.
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and COEs while on the right panel there are three lines including the one for the baseline
group. Why we cannot have clear interpretation of the coefficnets time series, the predicted
average of lnTFP in has different patten. From 1998 to 2004, SOEs are relatively less pro-
ductive compared to the Non-SOEs. Then SOEs catches up with the Non-SOEs in terms
of productivity and even surpass the Non-SOEs after 2005. However, Starting from year
2011, we see a decelaraton of TFP growth in SOEs but not in non-SOE firms.
(a) Coefficients (b) Predicted average lnTFP
Figure 3.4: Decomposition by SOE category
Figure 3.5 plots the dispersion of the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK). The
calculation of MRPK follows Chang-Tai Hsieh 2009. And the dispersion is measured as




Now we divide firms by sectors and run the same year-by-year regression in equation
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Figure 3.5: Dispersion of MRPK
3.10. We can get the predicted average lnTFP by sectors as shown in Figure 3.6. Here
the sectors are grouped by their main characteristics for the purpose of clear presentation.
Although it seems a bit messy in early years, the average lnTFP of all sectors displays
the dip that is similar to that of the average lnTFP of the total industry as a whole. This
means that the deceleration of TFP growth exists in every sectors, which contrasts to the
observation that it does not in every SOE category.
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Figure 3.6: Decomposition by Sectors
Privatization Slowing Down
In this subsection, we showmore difference between the SOEs and non-SOEs. More specif-
ically speaking, we are going to show that the privatization process has slowed down and
even reversed. And a possible reason for that is that the borrowing cost for non-SOEs have
gone up too much.
Figure 3.7 presents a mirroring pattern by construction. The blue curve presents the
share of real capital of non-SOEs and the red curve that of SOEs. From year 1998 to 2011,
the share of real capital of non-SOEs is always increasing except for year 2004. This is
mainly because of the privatization process in China. However, this privatization process
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics Capital by Ownership
Ownership
year POE SOE COE FOE
% % % %
1998 12.1 57.7 9.4 20.7
1999 13.8 55.2 8.8 22.2
2000 22.9 48.0 7.8 21.2
2001 38.6 33.7 5.8 21.9
2002 43.3 29.5 4.8 22.4
2003 44.6 28.2 4.0 23.1
2004 40.5 32.7 2.6 24.1
2005 41.8 30.0 2.0 26.1
2006 42.0 30.1 1.6 26.3
2007 50.8 21.1 1.4 26.6
2011 61.2 15.0 0.8 23.0
2012 58.1 16.2 1.0 24.7
2013 59.7 18.2 0.4 21.6
Total 45.8 40.1 5.9 24.0
seems to stop or even reverse starting from year 2011. More detailed break down can be
found in table 3.3. The SOE category in Figure 3.7 contains the SOE and COE in table 3.3,
while the non-SOE category contains the other two, POE stands for private owned firms,
and FOE for foreign investor owned firms.
In table 3.4 and table 3.5 show respectively the share of labor by different ownership
and the share of value added by different ownership. Both tables show a similar pattern to
table 3.3. All three tables reveal the same signal: by any type size measure (share of capital,
labor employment or value added), the SOEs have experienced a significant share drop in
the economy due to the privatization process. However, the process slows down starting
from 2011, which coincides with the timing of TFP drop.
In Figure 3.8, we show the average interest rate by SOE categories. The average interest
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics Labor by Ownership
Ownership
year POE SOE COE FOE
% % % %
1998 16.2 52.8 19.8 11.2
1999 19.3 48.5 18.8 13.4
2000 24.5 42.5 17.1 15.9
2001 37.1 31.8 13.8 17.4
2002 41.2 28.0 11.9 18.9
2003 45.0 23.1 9.7 22.2
2004 49.2 19.4 5.5 25.9
2005 50.5 17.2 5.0 27.4
2006 52.1 15.6 4.0 28.3
2007 55.6 12.0 3.4 29.0
2011 61.4 6.6 1.3 30.7
2012 61.4 6.5 1.3 30.8
2013 64.2 6.3 1.2 28.2
Total 50.5 33.4 13.0 24.6
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics Value Added by Ownership
Ownership
year POE SOE COE FOE
% % % %
1998 18.0 43.1 16.7 22.2
1999 21.1 37.5 14.8 26.7
2000 28.8 29.6 11.9 29.7
2001 44.3 20.9 7.8 27.0
2002 45.9 20.4 6.9 26.9
2003 45.6 19.1 5.5 29.8
2004 37.9 26.7 3.3 32.2
2005 40.1 27.1 3.4 29.5
2006 41.9 26.0 2.9 29.2
2007 55.3 13.1 2.4 29.3
2011 62.5 8.8 1.1 27.6
2012 64.0 7.9 1.1 27.0
2013 65.1 7.9 0.6 26.4
Total 47.9 28.0 9.3 28.4
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Figure 3.7: Shares of by SOE category
rate is measured as the interest expense over the debt. And in Figure 3.8 we only include
the interest rate between 0 and 1. We can see the borrowing cost of SOEs are much lower
than POEs. In all the years of the data set, the average interest rate of SOEs are below 4%,
while most of the years, the average interest rate of POEs are above 4% and but below 6%.
After 2004, the difference between the average interest rate is even widening between the
SOEs and POEs.
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Figure 3.8: Interests by SOE category
3.5 Compositional Transition Between SOEs and
Non-SOEs
In this section, we attempt to decompose the contributions of SOEs and Non-SOEs to ag-
gregate TFP dynamics. We present evidence showing that in the early period (1998 - 2011),
the TFP increase is mainly due to the within Non-SOEs TFP growth; while in the late pe-
riod (2011 - 2013), the TFP decrease is mainly related to the within SOE TFP decline. The
reallocation between SOEs and non-SOEs also plays a role in explaining the change of the
TFP growth path of the two periods. With more detailed decomposition within SOEs and
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non-SOEs, there is a within firm TFP growth flip in SOEs, but not in non-SOEs.
We now describe the decomposition. First, we start with the definition of total produc-







Moreover, to understand the connection between firm-level dynamics and a standard
measure of aggregate TFP, we define aggregate TFP as the Solow residual of an aggregate
production function with aggregate inputs Kt and Lt. That is, the aggregate TFP measure
can be expressed as follows:
































where s is the subscript for the SOE/non-SOE categories and is the firm identifier. The
expression above therefore links firm-level TFP measures to the aggregate measure. In
particular, the aggregate TFP measure is simply a weighted average of SOE and Non-SOE










Using this construct, we can also decompose the change in aggregate TFP between two
years into three parts as shown in equation 3.14: changes within SOE categories, changes
between SOE/non-SOE (driven by changes in privatization trends) and a covariance term.
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where r is the reference year, which we set to 2011, and t is the year in question. We
perform TFP growth decomposition for the 1998-2011 and between 2011–2013 separately.
The result of the decomposition in equation 3.14 is presented in 3.9a. The results are








Ait.). There are several features
worth noting in the unweighted results. First, there is a shift from positive to negative
contributions to aggregate TFP growth in both the within Non-SOE component (green)
and the within SOE component (red). Second, the contribution in the second period is
more negative in the SOE component than in the non SOE component. Third, movements
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of capital and labor away from SOEs and into SOEs also had positive effects during the
period, though these contribution only accounts for a small share of the total aggregate TFP
growth in TFP. Fourth, mirroring the privatization slow-down, the component switched
from positive to negative in the later sub-period.
Because there is a significant movement away from SOEs in this period, weighted
results assessing the quantitative impact of SOE growth depend on the year of reference
weights used. Since 2011 weights are used, this understates the quantitative impact of SOE
changes and overstates the impact of SOE changes. Using the labeling of 2011, we can
see that most of the contribution to TFP growth was driven by firms that were not SOEs in
2011, as well as by the privatization efforts leading to 2011. Consistent with the unweighted
results, the contribution of these forces reversed in the period between 2011-2013.
(a) Unweighted between-within SOE TFP Changes (b) Weighted between-within SOE TFP Changes
Figure 3.9: TFP Changes by SOE Category
The exercise above motivates our study of changes within the SOE and Non-SOE TFP
component. Each of these components can be further decomposed into five subcompo-
nents: within firm changes in TFP, reallocation of capital and labor between firms within
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each SOE/Non-SOE category, entry and exit, and covariance between within firm TFP
changes and the reallocation of capital and labor. The decomposition method is expressed
in equation 3.15.

















































































where stays is the subset of s, standing for firms that exist both in year t and in reference
year r in the category s; enters is the subset of s, standing for firms that newly enter into
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the market in reference year r and do not exist in year t in the category s; exits is the subset



































The result of the decomposition described in equation 3.15 is shown in Figure 3.10. The
first row is the weighted and unweighted within non-SOE TFP change while the second row
is the counterpart for the SOE TFP change. The first column is the weighted TFP change
while the second column is the unweighted TFP change. One interesting pattern is that for
SOEs, the within firm TFP change (maroon bar) flips from positive in the first sub-period
to negative in the second sub-period, while we do not observe the same change in non-
SOEs. This means that on average the measured TFP experience a decline for the existing
SOEs but not for the existing non-SOEs. Anther point is that the reallocation between firms
(green bar) causes a TFP growth flip in SOEs but not in non-SOEs, indicating that SOEs
may suffer more misallocation in the second sub-period compared to the non-SOEs.
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(a) Weighted within non-SOE TFP Changes (b) Unweighted within non-SOE TFP Changes
(c) Weighted within SOE TFP Changes (d) Unweighted within SOE TFP Changes
Figure 3.10: TFP Changes by within SOE/Non-SOE
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Table 3.6: Correlations between changes in TFP and changes in capacity utilization
All 1998–2007 2008–2013 1998–2011 2012–2013
D.lnTFP D.lnTFP D.lnTFP D.lnTFP D.lnTFP
D.Utilization 0.00144 0.00178 -0.0357 0.00178 -0.0357
(0.00171) (0.00144) (0.0285) (0.00144) (0.0285)
Constant 0.0907** 0.0969** 0.0464 0.0969** 0.0464
(0.0435) (0.0388) (0.212) (0.0388) (0.212)
Observations 72 63 9 63 9
R-squared 0.010 0.025 0.183 0.025 0.183
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.6 TFP trends and capacity dynamics
An alternative explanation for the patterns documented is that these are driven by capacity
utilization dynamics. This is certainly a possibility since, our measures of TFP, can are
affected by capacity utilization changes. In particular, the slow-down of TFP might be the
product of lagging capacity utilization.
To assess this potential challenge, we gathered data from Chinese Statistical Year Book
on capacity and production for available manufacturing sectors. A utilization variable was
constructed by dividing total production in that sector by the capacity measure. Sectors with
enough observations before and after 2008 were selected. Figure 3.11 present the trends in
average TFP and industry-level capacity for industries with available data and table 3.6
documents the correlation between changes in utilization and mean TFP at the sectoral
level. We find no evidence of strong correlation between changes in TFP and changes in
measured capacity utilization. Moreover, from the limited available evidence, we find no
evidence of a decrease in capacity utilization that could explain the deceleration in TFP.
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Figure 3.11: Trends in capacity utilization and TFP by industry
3.7 Conclusion
After a decade of growth, manufacturing TFP measured from both and aggregate and mi-
cro perspective seems to have decelerated in China after 2007. When decomposing this
changes, within-firm TFP changes among SOEs and privatization, which were drivers of
growth before 2007, seem to have reversed in the years after 2011. In particular, earlier
lags in productivity in SOEs when compared to POEs seem to have shrunk, suggesting that
an past avenue of growth might have been exhausted.
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1. Primal Measure and Dual Measure of TFP
The derivation in this subsection is an extension of Hsieh 2002.
Assume the market is perfectly competitive. The sector s’s output at time t Yst, should
be equal to the payment to the factors of the production, say capital and labor for the purpose
of illustration:
Yst = rstKst + wstLst (17)
whereKst and Lst are respectively the capital stock and labor employment, and rst and
wst are the rental price of capital and the wage.



































































is the growth rate of variable x, denoted as x^.
Then, the previous equation can be written as follows after rearrangement of terms:
Y^st   sKstK^   sLstL^st| {z }
Primal: A^Pst





The left-hand side is the primal measure used in KLEMS data, and the right-hand side
is the dual measure. The derivation only depends on one single assumption of market com-
petitiveness without any other assumption such as the form of the production function.
If the production is Cobb-Douglas Yst = AstKstL1 st , then sK = , sL = 1  .









st is the growth rate of the price of input j and s
j
st is its share.
It should be noticed that the theoretical equivalence between the primal measure and is
also true with more general CES production function.
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 1 , where  is the elasticity of substitution.
The Cobb-Douglas function is a special case, where the elasticity of substitution is  = 1.
This can be shown by using the l’Hopitale’s rule.




























































The difference between the general CES function and Cobb-Douglas function is that
the labor share and capital share now depend on capital stock and employment.
Without the the assumption of perfect competition, then the output is divided into three
parts, labor share, capital share and profit:
Yst = rstKst + wstLst + st (22)
where st is the profit of sector s at time t.
Performing a similar operation on the previous equation, we get:
Y^st   sKstK^st   sLstL^st = sKst r^st + sLstw^st + sst^st (23)
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Replace sKst = 1  sLst   sst in the previous equation:
Y^st   (1  sLst   sst)K^st   sLstL^st = (1  sLst   sst)r^st + sLstw^st + sst^st (24)
After rearranging the terms,
Y^st   (1  sLst)K^st   sLstL^st = (1  sLst)r^st + sLstw^st + sst(^st   K^st   r^st) (25)
Since ^st   K^st   r^st = ^st   drstKst = ^st   Y^st   ( drstKst   Y^st) = s^st   s^Kst ,
the previous equation can be rewritten as:
Y^st   (1  sLst)K^st   sLstL^st| {z }
Primal: A^Pst




st   s^Kst) (26)
Even with the true condition not being perfect competition, we can still calculate the
primal measure and dual measure of TFP growth. However, the previous equation shows
that it is no longer true that the primal measure equals the dual measure: the former exceeds
the latter by sst(s^st   s^Kst).
How is the dual measure computed in the data? Here are the steps:
• Compensation of Labor CompL: directly observed
• Labor L: directly observed, total hours or total employees
• Labor share sL = CompLY
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• Nominal wage wn = CompL
L
• Real wage growth w^ = w^n   ,  GDP-deflator inflation (Source: WDI)
• Compensation of Capital CompK = Y   CompL
• Capital share: sK = CompKY
• Capital Stock K: Estimated by perpetual inventory model
• Nominal rental price: rn from KLEMS data, and real rental price r^ = r^n   .
• Real rental price growth r^ = r^n   
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2. Amadeus Spain Summary Statistics
Following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2015, the data are downloaded from four vintage discs
of AMADEUS6 (June 2000, June 2003, June 2006, and December 2009) to deal with the
issues of download cap and missing records.7 From each disk, last five observations are
downloaded, which are not necessarily the last five years. For example, in 2006 dataset,
the last five observations could be 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, and 2000. The missing 2001
data may be due to the facto that there is no report. Before merging the data from different
vintage disks, I update the BVD ID of the firms that had BVD ID change between 1999
and 2009 to their BVD ID number in 2009, following the information downloaded from
website idchanges.bvdinfo.com.8 The updated BVD ID number then serves as the unique
identifier to merge the firms. After merging the data using the BVD ID number, I then drop
all the duplicates and drop all the consolidated firms. Some summary statistics are listed
here.
6AMADEUS is a product by Bureau van Dijk. Unlike the ORBIS dataset, which provides firm-level data
for companies around the world, AMADEUS focuses on European countries.
7Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2015 documents that if someone tries to download a lot of data at one time, the
download cap will translate into missing information of the downloaded data. It is also documented in their
paper that if a firms does not report anything in the last 5 years, it would be excluded even if it is still in
operation.
8This is the website that stores the history of BVD ID changes for all firms in products of Bureau Van
Dijk.
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Table 1: Size Distribution of Spanish Firms in All Sectors
YEAR 1 - 19 20 - 249 >=250 Total
Full Sample 1999 64539 34951 1595 101085
2000 93653 41902 1869 137424
2001 124955 47166 2109 174230
2002 170876 51343 2134 224353
2003 285163 56363 2239 343765
2004 406743 60387 2290 469420
2005 461818 63904 2339 528061
2006 496480 67471 2442 566393
2007 457458 65859 2484 525801
Total 2561685 489346 19501 3070532
Half Sample 1999 52540 29828 1206 83574
2000 77971 36700 1495 116166
2001 89330 42004 1739 133073
2002 94877 46531 1895 143303
2003 100290 50257 2041 152588
2004 103077 52674 2131 157882
2005 102434 53470 2145 158049
2006 100743 54002 2180 156925
2007 94579 51535 2198 148312
Total 815841 417001 17030 1249872
Stayers Sample 1999 19775 11048 433 31256
2000 20502 12803 505 33810
2001 20858 13939 565 35362
2002 21223 14972 604 36799
2003 21433 15572 632 37637
2004 21666 15973 647 38286
2005 22000 16232 697 38929
2006 22077 16602 733 39412
2007 22109 16715 780 39604
Total 191643 133856 5596 331095
Source: Amadeus Spain
In the permanent sample, the change of the numbers of firms in each category
is mainly because of data availability, meaning in 2007 more labor data of



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. Derivation of Price Index and Demand
Using the cost minimization method, we can back out the price of consumption goods in



















































1  + (1  )(pNt )1 ]
1
1  .
Therefore, we get CNt = Ct(
pNt
pt(1 ))




A special case is that when  = 1, the CES aggregator degenerates to a Cobb-Douglas




(1 )(1 ) , and the ratio of the non-tradable
expenditure on total expenditure is constant, CNt pNt = (1  )Ctpt.
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4. Derivation of Loan and Deposit Equilibrium Condition






























Rt(at 1)dH(at 1), Since at is i.i.d
.
To see why at i.i.d can lead to the separation of the integration of the product of vt 1

































(1 + rdt )vt 1dH(at 1)
= (1 + rdt )Vt 1H(a

t 1).
Combining the aggregate loan and aggregate deposit and equation 2.21, we can get rid
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of the aggregate wealth Vt and get:












(1 + rdt )(1  )H(at 1)
(1  ) (28)
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5. Derivation of Labor Market Equilibrium Condition in
the Non-tradable Sector
The law of motion of the aggregate wealth comes from the law of motion of the individual
wealth, (i.e., equation 2.20).
























+(1 + rdt )Vt 1H(a
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t 1), Since at is i.i.d





Labor demand in the non-tradable sector should be aggregated from the heterogeneous
























































, Since at is i.i.d
= 1 N
(1 )N ~wNt










By equating the labor supply and labor demand in the non-tradable sector, with the











6. Proof of  < 0
Theorem: If the following two conditions are satisfied:
1.the distributions of zT and zN are independent: G(zT ; zN) = GT (zT )GN(zN);
2.gx(zx)zx
Gx(zx)
( where x = T;N ) are decreasing functions,
then   0.

















where ! = wx
wy
. So   0 really means that the marginal worker who enters the sector
has a lower efficiency comparing to the sectoral average.

































Now when zT and zN are independent, (zx) = gx(zx)zxGx(zx) .
Moreover, when it is a decreasing function, Fa(t)  Fb(t), which gives the First
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Stochastic Dominance. Thus E(a)  E(b).
Therefore,   0.
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7. The Definition of Equilibrium
A set of variables: fat 1; rdt ; rbt ; pNt ; pt; wNt ; ~wNt ; wTt ; !t; Vt; LTt ; LNt g that satisfies the fol-
lowing equations (pTt = 1):






























































































N (1 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N )
( 11 
1+rdt
+ 
1+r
f
t
)N
(32)
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